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1 The role of business in development: 
traditional vs progressive 
 
Expectations about the role of businesses as development actors have become almost 
unrecognisable from the ones summarised by Milton Friedman: ‘The only social responsibility 
of business is to increase its profits’ (Friedman 1970). Despite Friedman’s relative 
abruptness, the role of business in contributing to the overall economic growth of a given 
country cannot be overstated. Businesses create employment, a taxation base for the state, 
generate innovation and provide goods and services for the population. No country has been 
able to develop (including the BRICS – Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa – and 
other rising powers) without a vibrant and competitive business sector. However, there is 
growing pressure on businesses nowadays to go well beyond their contribution to overall 
economic growth (which may be called the ‘traditional’ role of business in development) and 
become directly involved in poverty alleviation schemes, environmental regeneration 
activities and even the promotion of human rights.  
 
This second set of expectations depicts a more ‘progressive’ role for businesses in 
development. It may have begun with the more general term ‘corporate social responsibility’ 
but this progressive role keeps on evolving and can take many different forms, including 
business models such as the ‘Base of the Pyramid’ approach (first espoused by C.K. 
Prahalad), which proposes that business can involve the poorest inhabitants of a country 
both as consumers and as producers for their economic benefit as well as for the 
improvement of the businesses’ bottom line (Prahalad 2004). Other such business models 
are ‘inclusive business’ (ensuring that businesses include poor people within their core 
operations and not only as charity activities which do not challenge the companies’ business 
model), ‘making markets work for the poor’ (tackling the systemic market failures that 
exclude the poor from productive activities), and ‘pro-poor value chains’ (removing 
inefficiencies that prevent the poor from getting greater shares of the profits generated in a 
given chain). 
 
As globalisation of business has spread around the world, these expectations about the role 
of businesses in development extend to the operation of business in developing countries 
and particularly in low-income countries in Africa. There are, however, concerns about the 
capacity and intent of any foreign business operating in Africa and claiming to be a 
responsible corporate citizen. Businesses from the global North have been the usual targets 
of these concerns but as firms from the BRICS increase their presence beyond their ‘near 
abroad’1 and venture into African markets, their role as true progressive partners in 
development has been increasingly scrutinised.  
 
It could be argued that this heightened scrutiny has been brought about by South–South 
cooperation discourses often espoused by the BRICS and other rising powers highlighting 
the differences between BRICS and Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) countries with regard to their modes of engagement with low-income 
developing countries. Claims of egalitarian relationships where donor and recipient are 
considered equal partners in a ‘mutually beneficial’ arrangement abound within South–South 
cooperation discourses (Brautigam 2009; Kragelund 2010; Younis et al. 2013). Even when 
these cooperation arrangements are taking place between a country such as China and a 
low-income country in Africa, the discourse remains. Clearly these claims of egalitarianism, 
mutual benefit and lack of conditionality (all traits which are used to distinguish South–South 
                                               
1 The exception here being South Africa for whom the rest of Africa is part of its ‘near abroad’. 
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cooperation from OECD aid flows) raise questions as to whether they are, in fact, being put 
into practice and not only in discourse. Questions about whether businesses from these 
countries also apply or abide by these principles also deserve attention.  
 
Business activity from some BRICS countries in Africa (particularly China and to a lesser 
extent India) is more widely reported than for other members of the bloc and there is often a 
critical tone. The role of Brazilian firms has been reported more favourably with some 
exceptions, notably the mining giant, Vale. The role of South African firms in the rest of Africa 
has been studied in more depth and perhaps with more sophistication given the penetration 
of South African business in a variety of industrial and retail sectors in Africa, giving a more 
nuanced picture. Russian firms and their presence in Africa is rarely covered by the 
mainstream media and there are few academic sources available.  
 
This study will therefore provide original material on the lesser-known presence of 
businesses from a subset of the BRICS as potential partners for development in Africa. 
Based on interviews with firms from Brazil, Russia and South Africa as well as the review of 
secondary material, the following sections discuss a variety of activities deployed by these 
firms in Africa, which they consider to be developmental, and the justification behind them. 
Section 2 reports on the case of Brazilian firms operating in Africa; Sections 3 and 4 do the 
same for South Africa and Russia, respectively. Section 5 summarises how the operations of 
Chinese and Indian firms are viewed in the literature with regard to their corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) involvement (used as a proxy for ‘developmental engagement’) and 
compares those views with the evidence provided in this study for the other three BRICS 
countries: Brazil, Russia and South Africa. Section 6 concludes. 
8 
 
2 Brazilian business in Africa2 
 
The presence of Brazilian businesses in Africa has never been as large as that of the other 
rising powers, but during the government of ex-President Lula da Silva (2003–10) the country 
saw an increase both in its volume as well as in the way it was promoted as part of Brazil’s 
economic diplomacy strategy. Motivations for this diplomatic and economic ‘expansion’ 
towards the continent are varied and some have been explained by a renewed emphasis on 
the South–South cooperation discourse as a counterweight to the traditional North–West 
model of delivering cooperation to Africa (Costa Leite et al. 2014). Other analysts explain that 
the Lula presidency aimed to show its economic orthodox credentials (business friendliness) 
by supporting the internationalisation of Brazilian firms with large loans and/or simply by 
inviting them to join Presidential visits to several African countries (CINDES 2011). Another 
explanation is the need to strengthen the Brazilian economic presence in Africa in order to 
compete with other rising powers such as China and India for a share of the continent’s 
growing markets as well as its resources.  
 
Trade between Brazil and the African continent grew from US$5bn to US$27bn in ten years 
(Lula da Silva’s government and the first two years of Dilma Roussef’s government, up to 
2012). This represents an impressive growth of 500 per cent (albeit from a very low base) 
which contrasts with a more moderate growth in trade between Brazil and Europe            
(240 per cent) and with Brazil’s largest single trade partner, the United States (US)           
(140 per cent) (Revista Cidade 2011). However, trade patterns did not change much from 
previous decades in as much as it continued to be concentrated in a few countries and 
products (African exports to Brazil have not diversified much from natural resources) 
(CINDES 2011). 
 
It is therefore difficult to see whether the ‘diplomacy offensive’ that characterised the Lula 
governments had any developmental impact (traditional or progressive) linked to changes in 
trade patterns that could benefit Brazil’s trade partners in Africa. Trade concentration was 
quite high, with Brazilian exports directed to a few countries in West Africa, North Africa and 
South Africa. Brazil imported oil mostly from Nigeria and Angola and 48 per cent of Brazilian 
exports went to only three African countries (CINDES 2011).  
 
When it comes to the composition of those trading relations, the developmental impacts are 
even more ambiguous beyond increased volumes (and increased revenues) of items 
exported from Africa to Brazil. Brazil tended to export manufactured products to Africa 
(including those coming from the food processing industry) and import mostly oil (85 per cent 
of imports) from Africa (CINDES 2011). 
 
With regard to more traditional forms of development cooperation that also involves (and 
benefits) Brazilian companies, Angola seems to have been the country that benefited the 
most. The Brazilian development bank BNDES (Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento 
Econômico e Social – Brazilian National Economic and Social Development Bank) opened 
credit lines for large Brazilian construction firms such as Odebrecht and Camargo Corrêa to 
carry out important infrastructure projects in housing, transport, communications, energy 
stations, water provision and sewage systems. Angola was allocated a credit line of 
US$3.2bn by BNDES. Other countries with BNDES credit lines were Ghana, Mozambique 
(which benefited the Brazilian mining company, Vale) and South Africa (CINDES 2011). 
                                               
2 The material in Section 2 is based on face-to-face interviews with Brazilian private and public enterprises operating in Africa, 
as well as with some governmental agencies involved in industrial development policy. The interviews were carried out in 
October and November 2012 at the headquarters of these businesses and government organisations in Brazil.  
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These loans have a ‘concessional’ aspect as they recognise the ‘developing nature’ of the 
beneficiary countries and fix low interest rates of 2 per cent or lower for the life of the loan.  
 
These loans were justified to the Brazilian public – and complied with the Brazilian legal 
framework that regulates international cooperation – in such a way that they were not meant 
to support development objectives in Africa but were given to support the internationalisation 
of Brazilian firms and their exports to the African continent. However, the framing given to 
this support during the Lula governments aimed to show a more progressive and 
disinterested motivation for this brand of economic diplomacy than the one followed by his 
successor, Dilma Rousseff, who has tended to emphasise the mutual commercial benefits of 
these loans and initiatives instead of dressing them up as ‘solidarity projects’ with the African 
nations.  
2.1 Main trends from interviews with government agencies 
When compared with the outward-looking government programmes during ex-President 
Lula’s terms, the current trend amongst government agencies working with the Brazilian 
private sector is one of slow disengagement with Africa. Agencies like ABDI (Agência 
Brasileira de Desenvolvimento Industrial – Brazilian Agency for Industrial Development) have 
redirected their efforts from countries like Mozambique and Angola to Mercosur and other 
parts of Latin America. Projects to develop processing and manufacturing plants in Africa 
had been seen as audacious in the past, even by some of ABDI’s own staff, but as ties have 
grown stronger with beneficiaries in Africa there is a sense that opportunities for investment 
are being lost now that – due to the domestic and regional new priorities set by the team of 
President Dilma Rousseff – those projects will not be finished. 
  
Commercial ties rather than grants or solidarity loans are the new orthodoxy with regard to 
Brazilian industrial engagement with Africa. A new focus on markets in the global North has 
also ensued, viewed as a way to upgrade Brazilian firms’ capabilities by supporting them to 
export to ‘more sophisticated’ (for example, North America and Europe) markets and hence 
become more globally competitive. This shift is also aimed at increasing the export of 
manufactures instead of natural resource-based products to Asia, particularly to China. In 
October 2012 there was growing alarm that for the first time the balance of trade between 
China and Brazil had tipped to the benefit of the former. 
 
Other agencies such as APEX (Agência Brasileira de Promoção de Exportações e 
Investimentos, an export promotion agency) have been assigned fewer resources in general, 
but this is particularly true in the case of resources destined to support exports to Africa. This 
is compounded by reluctance amongst medium-sized enterprises to venture outside of the 
large and lucrative Brazilian domestic market, which had been growing for over a decade. 
Medium-sized firms (usually the target for support by APEX) see few reasons to invest and 
take risks in the African market, leaving this task to the largest firms in Brazil in the sectors of 
construction, mining and natural resource-based products. 
  
The Ministry of Trade and Commerce (which oversees ABDI and APEX) contended that the 
presence of Brazilian private and public industries in Africa has not been reduced nor have 
economic flows diminished. A shift from grants and low-interest loans to commercial 
relationships and investment that seeks higher returns for Brazil has ensued. The official 
position is that this will actually improve conditions for Brazilian investment in Africa, which in 
turn will encourage higher numbers of projects and exports for the benefit of African 
economies whilst also promoting Brazilian economic interests. Emphasis on pragmatism and 
mutual benefit seems to have replaced discourses of solidarity and support to Africa. 
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2.2 Brazilian business in Africa: an overview 
It is difficult to know how much Brazil invests in Africa every year. Brazilian companies are 
highly protective of their data and although they comply with data-gathering requirements 
from the government, they register many foreign assets in fiscal paradises such as the 
Cayman Islands instead of clarifying the real final market (Hiratuka and Sarti 2011). 
 
According to the 2014 ranking of Brazilian multinational companies (MNC) prepared by 
Fundação Dom Cabral, a well-known business school, Africa as a continent is placed fifth in 
terms of preferred locations for opening a subsidiary. Latin America, Europe, Asia and North 
America are all much more popular choices (FDC 2014). In 2006, from the top 20 Brazilian 
MNC only six had a presence in Africa: Vale do Rio Doce (mining), Petrobras (oil and gas), 
Odebrecht (construction), Camargo Corrêa (construction), WEG (industrial engineering) and 
Marcopolo (vehicles) (Hiratuka and Sarti 2011). Most of these companies were interviewed 
for this report, with the exception of WEG and Marcopolo which are headquartered in the 
South of Brazil, away from the main cities visited for this research.  
 
However, in recent years an increasingly higher amount of Brazilian investment is going to 
Africa, making the region one of its fastest-growing destinations, particularly for franchises 
(FDC 2014). Brazilian firms may bring complementary sectors to Africa. For instance, 
construction companies have been invited to bid for large infrastructure projects linked to the 
activities of Brazilian mining industries. A large-scale example of this is the mining–
construction partnership between Vale and Odebrecht in Mozambique and particularly with 
the construction of the Nacala Corridor. These two sectors (mining and construction) are 
where Brazilian firms are mostly represented, but there is an increasing number of Brazilian 
manufacturing firms in other sectors (including franchising and small- and medium-sized 
enterprises) with a presence in Africa. 
 
A review of Vale’s website3 shows the company has been operating in Angola, Mozambique, 
Guinea and Zambia. Its most important operations are in Mozambique where the company is 
trying to mitigate the impacts of its operations by engaging in social projects led by the Vale 
Foundation. One project is to combat malaria by training its staff, distributing mosquito nets 
and other treatments to both its employees and contractors. The company has also been 
contributing US$3m every year for three years to the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, 
Tuberculosis and Malaria since 2013. Another social programme (aimed at their African 
personnel) is outlined in Box 2.1.  
 
 
                                               
3 www.vale.com. 
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An interesting aspect of Vale’s Sustainability Report (Vale 2014), as well as the Ethics and 
Values section of its website, is the inclusion of the list of codes, commitments, treaties and 
organisations of social development the business is linked to: 
 
 Vale Human Rights Policy (created in 2009 following the United Nations (UN) 
Framework for Business and Human Rights; Vale published a second version in 2012 
and it was updated in 2013 to include ‘advances since its publication, in 2009’ (op. cit.). 
Its social and environmental reporting has become much more detailed and 
sophisticated since 2009. Social expenditure was estimated at US$270.4m (op. cit.: 44).  
 Vale Code of Ethics and Conduct (op. cit.); and 
 Vale Sustainable Development Policy (op. cit.). 
 
The main codes Vale has signed are: 
 
 International Council on Mining and Metals (ICMM); 
 United Nations Global Compact initiative; and 
 International Labour Organization conventions for decent work, elimination of all the 
worst forms of child labour and commitment against slave labour.  
 
Angola has been an important node to link Brazil with sub-Saharan Africa. Petrobras (the 
main oil company in Brazil) and Odebrecht both started operations in Angola towards the end 
of the 1970s and even though the civil war affected Odebrecht’s operations, the company 
Box 2.1 An example of a vocational/social programme by Vale in  
  Africa  
Below is a case study taken from Vale’s 2013 Sustainability Report: 
 
‘Workers qualified by program in Mozambique 
The program Acreditar (Believe) was developed by Vale in partnership with one of the 
companies responsible for the construction of the Moatize Project, to empower neighbouring 
communities, where the company operates a coal mining complex. The initiative sought to 
qualify the local workforce to operate in the project, through specific technical courses. In 2012 
and 2013, more than 1.3 thousand people were trained. 
 
Actions have been developed in partnership with Dom Bosco Centre and the National Institute 
of Employment and Vocational Training (Inefp in Portuguese). The selection process was 
implemented in several stages. First, the local communities received numbers, followed by a 
process of evaluation of basic requirements. Tete residents over 18 years old that had 
completed the 6th grade (local education) could apply. Once selected, the candidate took 
Portuguese and mathematics tests. Those that passed with 50 per cent or more went through 
medical and psychological tests, after which only the final selected were left. 
 
The initiative began in 2012 and was completed in 2013. In all, 942 people completed the Basic 
Module, and 389 completed the Specific Module. In addition to being strategic to operations – 
the level of local hiring in Mozambique is higher than 80% – the initiative rose the level of local 
professional qualifications, as graduates may act as multipliers and transfer knowledge to 
others. 
 
Acreditar is the result of our commitment to acting in the development of the local workforce and 
raising the educational level in projects and in regions where we operate.’ 
 
Source: Vale (2013b: 44).  
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made the strategic decision not to leave Angola. Brazil was also the first country to recognise 
Angola after the civil war, which paved the way for a ‘special relationship’ between Angola 
and Brazil to emerge. This closeness was also reinforced by a common language 
(Portuguese) and other perceived cultural similarities. 
 
Odebrecht was the second largest construction company (after a number of Chinese firms) 
to get involved in large construction projects in the housing sector in Angola. However, 
recent analyses have shown that mismanagement of the oil-backed loans used to finance 
construction companies (not only Brazilian, but also Chinese) have led to the failure to attain 
the Angolan Government’s housing goals (Croese 2011). 
2.3  Main trends from interviews with Brazilian companies 
 operating in Africa 
Moving towards the private sector side of the Brazilian complex spectrum of organisations 
that provide support to businesses, there is SENAI (Serviço Nacional de Adiestramento 
Industrial – National Agency for Industrial and Vocational Training). This is one of the 
flagship agencies of the CNI (Confederação Nacional da Indústria – National Confederation 
of Industries), a private sector-led organisation which was created by government policy and 
provides public goods to the Brazilian population in employment and their families. During 
President Lula da Silva’s two terms, SENAI spearheaded a number of centres for vocational 
training in several African countries but these projects are no longer being encouraged. The 
new priority for SENAI is to strengthen industrial skills and capabilities amongst the Brazilian 
poor.  
  
When talking to private firms in the mining, oil and gas, construction and agriculture sectors, 
words such as ‘hardship’, ‘opportunity’ and ‘accomplishment’ emerge – ‘hardship’ being used 
to express how investment and work conditions in Africa seem to them much more difficult 
than, according to one interviewee, ‘even in the poorest areas of the north-east [of Brazil]’. 
For these reasons, some of the firms said it has been a challenge to find staff willing to move 
to Africa to lead and implement projects. This challenge has been compounded by a labour 
shortage within Brazil, given the expansion of the economy for more than a decade up to 
2012 when these interviews were carried out (2009 and 2012 being the exceptions) and the 
creation of new local jobs. Institutional challenges such as contract enforcement, facilitation 
of payments and competition with Chinese and Indian firms in Africa have added to this 
sense of hardship.  
 
‘Opportunity’ was the other notion that firms expressed when referring to their work in Africa. 
Construction firms in particular view African weak infrastructure as an opportunity for 
investment and for obtaining support from BNDES in the shape of loans geared towards the 
internationalisation of Brazilian firms. According to some interviewees, over the last decade 
many new Brazilian multimillionaires were created as a result of large infrastructural projects 
but also thanks to the increased demand for engineering services and other technical 
maintenance services for mining and construction provided by small Brazilian firms. Brazilian 
construction firms represent the sector that has spent most time in Africa and had the most 
nuanced view of Africa – they stayed in countries such as Angola during war and conflict and 
even claim to be regarded as ‘local’ companies, a status they say has been reinforced by 
their commitment to employing and training local people to work for them. This was also part 
of the model they wanted to foster, to be seen as ‘African’ construction firms instead of 
Brazilian. Odebrecht was frequently mentioned (by other firms as well as government 
agencies) as the Brazilian construction firm that had the best reputation in Africa linked to 
high quality standards and timeliness in finishing projects, as well as involvement in social 
housing projects. Although this study did not carry out interviews in Africa, a review of 
Odebrecht’s annual reports shows a clear intention to showcase its operations in Africa and 
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the number, variety and complexity of its programmes seem to be setting an example for 
other Brazilian companies operating in Africa.  
 
Mining companies such as the giant Vale have also seen in Africa a land of opportunity with 
large projects in Mozambique leading the way. However, this is the Brazilian firm which has 
been internationally criticised the most, including an embarrassing award of ‘Worst Company’ 
as a result of 25,000 online votes in an annual poll organised by Swiss non-profit Public Eye 
(Chaudhuri 2012). In addition, political instability and complex relationships with partners 
have seen their investments shadowed by scandal in places such as Guinea (EXAME 2012; 
Pearson 2012).  
 
During the interviews in Brazil, exporters of manufactures tended to be more conservative 
about their assessments of opportunities in Africa as local competition from South African 
and Chinese manufacturers thwarted many ambitious plans, such as those of Brazilian 
cosmetics firm O Boticário which closed operations in Africa after a few years or the many 
small- and medium-sized enterprises that did not benefit from the ‘Brazilian content’ clause 
included in the BNDES internationalisation loans to large companies. Regardless of these 
limitations, a number of personal services franchises ranging from hairdressers to language 
schools are now expanding to Africa according to the Brazilian Franchise Association 
(interview with adviser to ABF – Associacao Brasileira de Franquicias). 
 
‘Accomplishment’ and ‘responsibility’ were also frequently mentioned by interviewees from 
the private sector when referring to their operations in Africa. Several interviewees expressed 
that in Africa their social responsibility projects are even more important than in Brazil 
because of the dire social and economic conditions in which their African employees live. A 
mining company engineer explained how their company became involved in sponsoring 
orphanages for children whose parents had died of AIDS, which is something they would 
never attempt in Brazil to avoid being accused of creating projects that foster dependency 
(assistencialistas in the original Portuguese) instead of empowerment. In many 
geographically remote areas where these companies operate, they have decided to fill the 
vacuum left by the absence of a strong state (for health, education and security) to help their 
employees and their families. Given that Brazilian firms tend to employ African labour, these 
social initiatives for employees benefit the local community. Much has been said about the 
fact that Brazilian firms invest in training the local workforce and regardless of their motives 
(i.e. Brazilian shortage of labour or genuine desire to build local capabilities), this is a key 
feature of Brazilian business practice in Africa with clear links to development objectives.  
 
Surprisingly, the largest oil and gas company from Brazil, Petrobras (which is invested with a 
large percentage of government capital), never got involved in social programmes in Africa 
and is now disinvesting in order to focus on Brazilian domestic priorities. This finding goes 
against the assumption linking state-owned companies with social programmes and privately 
owned companies being associated with little investment in the area of social development.  
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3  South African business in the rest of Africa4 
3.1 The South African private sector and the region 
The standard response from South African business people, when asked about why they do 
so well in Africa, is often ‘because we know Africa so well’. Although there is some truth in 
this assessment, the key feature distinguishing South Africa from other foreign investors in 
their assessment of risk relates to the issue of expectation. South African investors expect to 
be faced with logistical and bureaucratic hurdles when contemplating investment in the 
continent, even though many would agree that they evaluate risk in exactly the same way as 
their foreign competitors do. There is no magic bullet to overcome the many barriers and 
pitfalls that accompany investment in Africa. However, South African investors who are often 
relative newcomers to other countries on the continent outside the Southern African Customs 
Union (SACU),5 and more recently the Southern African Development Community (SADC), 
have shown remarkable skill at developing coping strategies to deal with the challenges 
inherent to many African economies, including a lack of infrastructure (power, water, roads, 
rail) and a difficult political and economic environment.  
 
Arguably, for the South African private sector the business case matters even more than for 
government-driven investments given the risk inherent to an expansion strategy outside their 
home market. On the whole, large South African companies have had to bankroll and trust 
their own business instincts in making a success of their ventures across South Africa’s 
borders. However, they have also found, like other investors in Africa, that although the risks 
are great, the returns are high. The average return on investment in Africa, depending on the 
sector, is up to four times higher than in the G8 countries, and twice as high as in Asia. 
3.2 A profile of South African investment in Africa 
South African involvement is weakest in parts of francophone and North Africa. South 
Africa’s latecomer status to French-speaking Africa is illustrated by the fact that Standard 
Bank only opened a representative office in Côte d’Ivoire in February 2014. This makes it the 
first South African bank to expand into francophone West Africa. The company indicated that 
while it is following its clients into the region as per its standard strategy, it would use the 
office to familiarise itself with the francophone West Africa region. Standard Bank views its 
office in Côte d’Ivoire as a potential hub for the West African Economic and Monetary Union, 
which is made up of Benin, Burkina Faso, Guinea-Bissau, Côte d’Ivoire, Mali, Niger, Senegal 
and Togo. The opening of the Côte d’Ivoire office expands Standard Bank’s operations into 
19 African countries. Nedbank, one of the four main South African banks, indicated that it 
would be exploring opportunities in West Africa with a local partner, Ecobank, one of the 
main banks in Côte d’Ivoire, signalling a growing interest by South African business in this 
region (Ndzamela 2013). 
 
South Africa is also one among many players in Africa’s big economies (Kenya, Egypt, 
Nigeria and Angola) where it faces significant competition from traditional European but also 
many new investors from the emerging South. However, it is dominant in its immediate 
neighbourhood. South Africa is the leading investor in SACU because of its long-standing 
institutionalised relationship and history and the country also has a well-established foothold 
in all sectors in its other immediate neighbours, Zimbabwe and Mozambique. This 
prominence as a leading investor has rapidly expanded into the rest of the member states of 
                                               
4 Section 3 is an extract from a report commissioned by the RPID programme to specifically contribute to the present study: 
‘Business from the BRICS: South Africa’ by Neuma Grobbelaar, South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA), March 
2014.  
5 The members of SACU are South Africa, Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland. SACU was established in 1910. 
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the SADC,6 even into such challenging environments as the Democratic Republic of Congo 
(DRC). But, as noted earlier, South African corporates are also extending their reach into 
other African countries as far flung as Nigeria, Mali, Ghana, Senegal and Egypt.  
 
However, an overview of the type of South African investment into the rest of Africa shows 
that, generally, so-called big or ‘mega’ South African investments – such as the building of 
the Mozal aluminium smelter (total outlay US$2.2bn), the laying of the Sasol pipeline 
(US$1.2bn) and the merger of AngloGold and Ashanti Goldfields of Ghana (US$1.4bn) – are 
rare. The South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA) study found that medium-
sized investments in agribusiness, particularly sugar production, railways, finance and 
insurance, telecommunications, utilities, tourism, health, entertainment and breweries are 
more common. However, the majority of investments, especially in the retail sector, are 
generally much smaller, although ironically much more visible as evident in the changing 
cityscapes across the continent.  
 
This finding seems to correlate with a 2003 United Nations Industrial Development 
Organisation (UNIDO) study that found that 40 per cent of all foreign investors in Africa 
invested less than US$1m per project (UNIDO 2003: xii). In Mozambique, the largest 
recipient of South African foreign direct investment (FDI), figures provided by the 
Mozambican investment promotion agency show that 85 per cent of individual South African 
investments or outlays were less than US$1m each between 1998 and 2002. This is despite 
the fact that South Africa was considered to be the leading investor there, representing       
49 per cent of total FDI by the end of 2003.  
 
South African investments are a mix of greenfield investments (especially in energy, mining 
and property) and mergers and acquisitions linked to privatisation, especially in agribusiness, 
finance, tourism and manufacturing (mainly breweries). Investment in telecommunications 
straddled both types. ‘Investments’ in the case of South African parastatals are often linked 
to a specific concession for a limited period, often a maximum of 15 years.  
 
Whereas several South African companies choose to operate on their own, when given the 
choice many opt to take on a local partner as a risk mitigating choice. In strategic 
investments there is a mandatory obligation to take on the government as an active partner. 
In both Ghana and Mali the government reserves the right to retain a free share in any 
investment in the mining sector.7 However, some companies believe that the appointment of 
members of the government or prominent individuals that are close to the government onto 
their boards (where it is mandatory and/or allowed) brings certain advantages in navigating 
the operating environment better.  
 
It is important to note that the most visible South African investments in the region are 
implemented by a relatively small but prominent group of South African companies.8 This 
does cast some doubt over the perspective held in some quarters that South Africa is an 
economic hegemon bent on dominating the region (see Daniel, Naidoo and Naidu 2003; 
                                               
6 Businessmap found that South Africa was ranked in SADC member states in the period 1994–2003 in the following manner: 
Angola (1 per cent of total foreign direct investment – FDI) ranked sixth; Botswana (58 per cent of total FDI) ranked first; DRC 
(71 per cent of total FDI) ranked first; Lesotho (86 per cent of total FDI) ranked first; Malawi (80 per cent of total FDI) ranked 
first; Mozambique (31 per cent of total FDI) ranked first; Namibia (21 per cent of total FDI) ranked third; Swaziland (71 per cent 
of total FDI) ranked first; Tanzania (35 per cent of total FDI) ranked second; Zambia (29 per cent of total FDI) ranked first; and 
Zimbabwe (24 per cent of total FDI) ranked third. See Rumney and Pingo (2004). 
7 In Ghana, the government has reserved the right to retain a 10 per cent free share in any investment in the mining and energy 
sector, with an option to acquire a further 20 per cent in mining explorations and investments. In Mali, the government also 
retains a share in 10 per cent of shares as mandatory royalty, with an option to increase this share to 20 per cent. 
8 The same group of just over 20 key players was encountered repeatedly throughout the region in the SAIIA study, namely 
SABMiller, Shoprite Checkers, Unitrans, Barloworld, Standard Bank, ABSA Bank, Game Stores, Southern Sun, AngloGold 
Ashanti, Randgold Resources, Illovo Sugar, Debonnairs, Dimension Data, Nandos, BHP-Billiton, Engen, Sasol, Vodacom, MTN 
and Tongaat Huletts. 
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Cling 2001). The scale of South African investment both in terms of the number of 
companies and the value of investment does not support this notion.  
 
Of course, South Africa’s investment profile differs quite substantially in its immediate 
neighbourhood and in the SACU states when compared with Central, West and North Africa 
where South African companies are finding it much harder to penetrate markets. Whereas 
language and cultural barriers are important, and geographical distance seems to play a role 
amongst many other factors, the level of competition is a key factor in some of these 
markets. Thus South African companies have to be very selective in identifying niche 
markets in carefully selected sectors when venturing beyond the borders of the SADC.  
 
Outside the SADC, South African investment tends to follow the traditional investor approach 
to Africa, namely focusing mainly on trade and the extractive industry sector, with a few rare 
exceptions such as telecommunications and energy supply. However, a wide range of small 
entrepreneurs in the form of one-man businesses are very active in South Africa’s immediate 
neighbours such as Mozambique and Botswana, especially in farming, tourism and trading. 
Although their activities are very difficult to track and monitor, they are important players in 
the small markets of these economies.  
 
Lastly, if there is anything unique about the ‘first-mover’ advantage profiled in the South 
African investor presence in the region, it is the sheer diversity of investment outside Africa’s 
extractive industry sector.  
3.3 The impact of South African companies in the region 
On the whole, when considering the South African private sector’s contribution to 
development, it is important to note that they are actors mainly driven by a profit incentive. 
Given that this is the primary drive for their engagements, socioeconomic and developmental 
impacts are not necessarily their key priority. Nevertheless, because of the unique under-
developed status of many African countries signified in the small size of their markets, there 
is no doubt that South African corporates are having a significant developmental impact in 
the region. These are often described as economic effects, rather than development effects. 
The impact is most visible on the development of the private sector in the region and its 
various participants and beneficiaries. Section 3.3 draws on the results of SAIIA’s Business 
in Africa Research Project (Games 2004).  
3.3.1 The impact of South African companies on the labour market in the 
 region 
South African business involvement in the region has had a marked effect on the structure of 
the labour market, more specifically on wage levels, job creation, benefits and training.  
 
For example, in Mozambique the minimum monthly wage established by law is MT814,602 
(Mozambican Metical) (ZAR325) for industry, commerce and services, and MT570,000 
(ZAR228) for agriculture.9 However, the entry of some of the South African companies into 
the job market has had a striking impact on wage structures. The highest-paid labour group 
in Mozambique is the highly skilled workers at the Mozal smelter. According to the 
Mozambique News Agency, the lowest wage paid to a smelter worker is US$4,000 per 
annum or US$416 per month. This salary is ten times the statutory minimum wage 
(Mozambique News Agency 2001). Cervejas de Moçambique (CDM), a subsidiary of 
SABMiller and another important investor in Mozambique, pays a minimum wage which is 
more than two-and-a-half times the statutory minimum (Goldstein 2003: 47). This impact on 
                                               
9 An exchange rate of MT2,500=R1.00 was used. Only 12 per cent of the entire workforce was in paid employment in 1999; 60 
per cent of them in the private sector. Eighty-four per cent of the labour force can be described as unskilled. Unemployment is 
considered to be about 21 per cent. See UNECA (2003: 144). 
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wages correlated with SAIIA’s findings in all of the countries that formed part of its sample 
group. In Mali, the mining sector pays salaries that are easily three times higher than the 
national private sector average. For example, a driver employed by one of the South African 
mines said that he earned CFCA280,000 a month, or just over US$500, which is linked to a 
productivity bonus. In his previous job as a driver with an international corporation he earned 
US$150 a month. In Botswana, one company paid 2 per cent more to its general staff other 
than management over the last five years, in line with the minimum wage framework outlined 
in the Government’s Vision 2016, which was developed to eradicate poverty in Botswana by 
2016.10 The same company pays a driver P1,900 per month, in contrast to the going rate of 
P700.  
Table 3.1  Minimum wages in the SAIIA survey sample compared to 
South Africa, 2006 
Country Minimum wage 
per day (US$) 
Minimum wage 
per month (US$) 
Length of work 
week (hours) 
Statutorily 
enforced? 
Botswana 3.15 – 48 Yes 
Egypt – 33 48 Yes 
Ghana 2 – 40 Yes 
Kenya – 72.70 52 Yes 
Mali – 53* 40 Yes 
Mozambique – 58** 40–48 Yes 
Nigeria – 41.70 40 Yes 
Senegal – 76 40–48 Yes 
Zimbabwe – 10–12 54 No**** 
South Africa – 142*** 45 Yes 
 
Notes: * Employees in agricultural sector get US$33; ** Employees in agricultural sector get US$40; *** Employees in urban 
areas; the minimum wage in rural areas is US$126; **** Minimum wage has only been set for agricultural and domestic workers. 
 
Source: Data compiled from US Department of State (n.d.). 
 
As can be seen from Table 3.1, wages in South Africa are the highest in the region, which 
may explain why South African firms coming to other parts of Africa offer better salaries than 
local companies. These findings correlate with the general assessment that foreign-owned 
companies offer higher real wages and better working conditions than local companies. A 
study conducted by te Velde and Morrissey (2002) of wage levels in foreign-owned 
companies in five African countries confirms that foreign ownership of a company is 
associated with higher wages at the individual worker level because jobs are generally more 
skills intensive. This finding corroborates with the SAIIA findings that in general, significantly 
higher levels of productivity are achieved in some of the South African-owned firms. For 
example, in Mozambique it is estimated that the productivity per worker in Mozal is 18 times 
higher than that in the average domestic firm (Castel-Branco 2002: 16).  
 
However, this positive news is somewhat tempered by the relatively modest creation of new 
employment opportunities by foreign investors.  
 
                                               
10 Although there is a statutory minimum wage for industry employees of about R500 per month that is set by the Minister of 
Labour, this varies from sector to sector and is much lower in agriculture (personal interview by Neuma Grobbelaar with BEDIA, 
20 April 2004). In the construction industry, for example, labour costs are considered to be much lower than in South Africa. The 
lowest level of skilled worker is paid about P2.60 per hour, which is a statutory requirement. Minimum wages are set for the 
building industry, the car service and distributing sector, road transport, the hospitality and entertainment industry, 
manufacturing and retail and wholesale trade. See also UNCTAD (2003: 32). 
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South African investment in Mozambique, as is the case with FDI in other parts in the world, 
has not necessarily led to the creation of new, permanent positions on the large scale that 
the Mozambican economy needs. However, the addition of 24,355 jobs (1998–2002) to the 
Mozambican economy by South African employers is not insignificant given the context of a 
formal economy that employs just 15 per cent of the workforce, as shown in Table 3.2.  
Table 3.2  South African investment in Mozambique: employment figures, 
1998–2002 
 
Source: Grobbelaar and Besada (2008). 
 
SAIIA’s research found that job creation in construction is cyclical and project-bound. The 
Mozal project created 5,033 temporary positions (70 per cent for Mozambicans) during its 
construction and expansion phases. However, its full staff complement after completion of 
the expansion is about 800. More than 300 Mozambican contractors worked on the 
construction of the Sasol pipeline, generating wages in excess of US$5m, although once the 
pipeline was laid, its full staff requirement shrunk dramatically, to under 200. However, both 
examples represent snapshots in the lifecycles of these two projects and do not reflect the 
expected increase in jobs related to upstream and downstream activities flowing from them in 
the longer term.  
 
The agricultural and mining sectors are important exceptions because of their labour-
intensive nature. South African investment in two sugar mills and estates in Mozambique at a 
fraction of the cost of the Mozal and Sasol mega-projects created 3,034 permanent positions 
and 5,398 temporary positions for seasonal workers. This finding is consistent across the 
agricultural sector in Africa and highlights the need for African governments to do more to 
attract investment into this critical sector.  
 
In some of Africa’s resource-rich economies, mining is a significant job creator. For example, 
despite Debswana’s capital-intensive mining activities, it is the second largest employer in 
Botswana outside the government with a total of 6,300 workers.11 The Malian gold mining 
sector (in which South African companies have a very significant stake) employs about 5,000 
permanent workers and more than 6,000 contractors, and also indirectly creates thousands 
of jobs. This represents a significant boost to the formal economy. FDI into Ghana’s gold 
mining industry (where AngloGold Ashanti and Goldfields are important players) has 
                                               
11 See www.debswana.com/Sustainability/Pages/Our-People.aspx (home page, accessed 3 September 2015). 
Sector 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 Total 
Agriculture 607 2,669 6,551 472 80 10,379 
Aquaculture and fisheries 18  100  18 136 
Industry 1,218 554 229 162 197 2,360 
Resources and minerals  0 17  41 0 58 
Transport and 
communication 
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172 74 390 10 671 
Banking, insurance and 
leasing 
 
 
16  8 0 24 
Construction  399 3,337 2,168 437 6,341 
Tourism and hotel industry 346 172 560 71 22 1,171 
Others 438 289 167 576 1,745 3,215 
Total 2,652 4,288 11,018 3,888 2,509 24,355 
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generated a large amount of investment and capital, and the employment of approximately 
20,000 workers representing 5 per cent of total formal employment.  
 
In Mali, the activities of mining companies have boosted local economic development 
through both downstream and upstream businesses that service the mines. These effects 
are felt both at the national and provincial level, and include the introduction of regular 
chartered flights (the consequent demand for logistical services) and the provision of job 
opportunities for the owners of bus companies, taxis, plumbers, electricians and other 
artisans. The economic activity linked to mining also has a significant impact on housing. 
Villages in close proximity to the mines have grown into active business nodes through direct 
and indirect job creation. The mines have also established liaison structures with local 
communities, and have developed extensive outreach programmes. For example, the 
SEMOS (Societé d’Exploitation des Mines d’Or) Community Development Foundation, 
established by the Sadiola and Yatela mines, supports macro-projects in education, 
agriculture and water supply; provides microcredit for small businesses; and invests in 
capacity-building through training in literacy, numeracy, basic planning, business 
management skills and HIV/AIDS prevention. The Foundation has built classrooms and 
crèches, has contributed half the cost of a health centre in Kouroketo, which serves six 
villages close to the mine, and is actively involved, through the clinic, in the fight against 
malaria and bilharzia. 
 
However, perhaps of greater but less measurable importance is the influence of the entry of 
South African companies on labour practices and the business culture in Africa’s small 
formal economies. One of the main business chambers in Mozambique was unequivocally 
positive in its assessment of the influence of the large South African investors (especially 
blue chip companies such as CDM (SABMiller), BHP-Billiton and Sasol) on the Mozambican 
labour market, business culture and economy. The Head of the South African–Mozambican 
Business Chamber expressed the opinion that because South African companies are 
introducing best practice into the Mozambican economy through insistence on good 
corporate governance, their presence will influence the business culture positively in the long 
run. They are already making a significant social impact in their own spheres of activity, as 
illustrated by the creation of additional benefits for their employees. Private pension funds 
and medical aid schemes were previously non-existent in Mozambique. For example, 
although all companies are obliged to pay contributions into a government-led pension fund, 
the National Institute of Social Security (INSS), this has a limited financial reach.12  
 
Some of the large South African investors in Mozambique have looked with other foreign 
investors at developing norms for salaries, company pension funds and company medical aid 
schemes. CDM (SABMiller), for example, introduced a HIV/AIDS staff education and 
prevention programme in 2001, and has added the provision of antiretroviral therapy to the 
programme. Employees and their families now have free access to confidential treatment, 
counselling and medication, fully funded by the company. This is also true for other 
companies in the region. In Mali, employees and their dependants of South African mining 
companies now have access to better health-care benefits (such as good medical evacuation 
mechanisms and adequate health services) and there is better compliance with social 
security requirements, while provision has been made for HIV/AIDS prevention programmes 
and appropriate working garments such as uniforms, hard hats, special boots and protective 
clothing. South African companies are applying the accredited South African standards in 
their operations and there has been a noticeable improvement in the levels of personal 
safety within the mines. Companies also hold regular workshops on industrial safety and 
                                               
12 The financial soundness of the INSS is suspect. It does not disclose reliable financial statements based on independent 
actuarial evaluation on a regular basis. It is also the regulator of the pension sector. The International Monetary Fund strongly 
recommended in its Financial System Stability Assessment that regulatory procedures should be strengthened (IMF 2004b: 7, 
23). 
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social security for the trade unions, and trade union leaders interviewed during the survey 
gave high marks to South African firms for workplace safety.  
 
This highlights another – perhaps less clearly anticipated – impact on the labour market, 
namely its broader impact on labour-management relations and increasing unionisation. In 
most of the countries that formed part of SAIIA’s research unionisation was low. However, 
the entry of South African companies in these markets is having a significant impact on the 
organisation of labour, especially in the mining sector. For example, in Botswana more than 
one company pointed out that the mining sector is the most strongly unionised, particularly 
workers at Debswana.13 This is also the case in Mozambique. Because of Mozambique’s 
socialist past, aggressive labour union action against the government is unheard of, primarily 
because the trade union movement was previously government-driven and aligned. The 
growth of private, independent union movements is a recent occurrence and their strike 
actions are directed mostly at foreign businesses.14 Today, the country’s best-paid labour 
force, namely the workers at the Mozal smelter, is also the most unionised. The entry of 
South African companies in the region has also facilitated contacts between South African 
and other African unions. In certain cases, such as Mali, this interaction is believed to 
contribute towards a better understanding among the labour force of the needs of a globally 
active multinational.  
3.3.2 The impact on the trade balance, economic growth and revenue 
However, the impact of South African investment in the region is also highly visible in other 
areas. One of Mozambique’s outstanding economic success stories has been its almost 
uninterrupted high economic growth rate over the last 15 years. South African-led investment 
in conjunction with significant foreign aid flows into Mozambique has made the most 
immediate and visible impact on gross domestic product (GDP) growth and exports.  
 
The first substantial inflow of South African FDI began in 1997 with the construction of the 
Mozal smelter. Investment inflows increased from US$64m in 1997 to US$235m in 1998. In 
2002, when the smelter came onstream, this project single-handedly contributed about       
2.1 per cent to real GDP growth. In the same year, Mozal was responsible for 53 per cent of 
total exports and 28 per cent of total imports.  
 
Although some analysts regard the growth in imports that accompanies the establishment of 
mega-projects less positively than others, the Mozal project (see Table 3.3) resulted in a net 
positive impact on the balance of payments of around US$100m in 2002.15 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
13 This perception was reinforced by the illegal strike action of 400 workers from Debswana in 2004 and the protracted 
negotiations following this action. 
14 Interview with Mr Jeremias Timana, Secretary General of Consilmo on 20 March 2002 and Dr Astrid Becker, Resident 
Representative, Friedrich-Ebert Foundation, Maputo on 15 March 2002. See Grobbelaar and Lala (2003). 
15 See Castel-Branco (2002: 17), who argues that imports from South Africa have grown with the increase in South African FDI 
and that export-orientated mega-projects (which are mainly focusing on primary goods) are making the Mozambican economy 
excessively vulnerable to the volatility of the world market. 
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Table 3.3  The impact of large projects on the Mozambican trade balance, 
2000–04 (US$m) 
 2000 2001 Preliminary 
2002 
Revised 
2003 
Projected 
2004 
Trade balance -799 -360 -581 -705 -229 
Exports, f.o.b. 364 703 682 896 1,259 
Large projects 127 441 468 632 973 
Other exports 237 236 213 265 286 
Imports -1,163 -1,063 -1,263 -1,602 -1,488 
Large projects -119 -231 -390 -646 -450 
Other imports -1,044 -832 -873 -955 -1,038 
 
Source: IMF Article IV, p. 36. 
 
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) predictions that real GDP growth would increase to 
over 8 per cent in 2004 owing to the coming onstream of both the aluminium smelter (Mozal 
II) and the gas pipeline (Sasol) have proven to be true. At the time, the IMF predicted that 
exports would increase by 40 per cent, whereas imports were expected to decline somewhat 
because of reduced construction activity resulting from the completion of these mega-
projects. At the same time, net international reserves were also projected to rise by US$40m 
during 2004 to a level of US$696m by the end of that year (translating into 5.5 months’ worth 
of imports).  
 
South African investment has also bolstered revenue for the Mozambican Government. 
Taxes paid by the Mozambican breweries have increased 700 per cent since the purchase 
by SABMiller of CDM in 1995 and the Laurentina brand in 2002, and CDM provided              
5 per cent of total tax revenue in 2003. However, tax revenue generated by the Mozal 
smelter is much more limited, as the complex has been given the status of an Industrial Free 
Zone (IFZ). The impact of these increased revenues and economic growth on poverty 
reduction is important, despite the problems associated with disparate rates of development 
in different sectors of the economy.  
 
In Mali, the most visible effect of South African investment has been to raise the volume of 
gold production dramatically (see Table 3.4). The increase is a direct result of the 
development of three new mines by South African companies, since artisanal gold panning 
has remained stable through the years at an annual production level of 2.2–2.4 tonnes since 
1996. In 1997, national gold production tripled after the opening of the Sadiola mine, which 
produced 11.9 tonnes in its first year. This was followed soon after by the start-up of the 
Morila mine in 2000, which yielded 4.5 tonnes in its first year and, in 2001, the Yatéla mine 
with an output of 4.7 tonnes. Overall, gold production has grown almost eightfold in less than 
a decade, from 6.6 tonnes in 1996 to 51.6 tonnes in 2003. As a result, the contribution of 
gold to real GDP has doubled every four years, from 2.25 per cent in 1992 to 6 per cent in 
1998 to 14 per cent in 2002 (WTO 2004: 64). Increased gold production has enabled the 
country to record an average rate of growth of about 5.2 per cent between 1999 and 2002. It 
also created a surplus in Mali’s trade balance in 2002, owing to exceptional gold production 
that year (WTO 2004: ix).  
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Table 3.4  Gold production, 1996–2003 (tonnes) 
 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Industrial 
production 
0.0 16.3 20.5 23.1 26.0 46.3 63.7 51.6 
- Yatéla 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 4.7 8.6 7.2 
- Morila 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 4.5 19.6 38.9 28.6 
- Syama 4.4 4.1 4.8 6.1 5.7 2.1 0.0 0.0 
- Sadiola 0.0 11.9 15.7 16.9 19.0 16.7 16.2 15.7 
- Other 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Gold 
panning 
2.2 2.2 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.4 2.4 N/A 
Exports 6.6 18.5 22.8 25.3 28.3 53.7 66.1 51.6 
 
Source: Malian authorities in WTO (2004). 
 
The increase in production has also resulted in a surge in government revenues derived from 
gold. In 2001, the state received about US$200m from gold exploitation.16 According to the 
World Trade Organization (WTO), royalties paid out by enterprises in the gold sector 
amounted to 1.3 per cent of GDP in 2002 (WTO 2004: 9). In addition, mining activities by 
South African companies have also bolstered tax and customs revenue, and added to payroll 
and social security charges paid to the government by South African companies. Gold 
exports brought in US$525.6m in export earnings in 2001, while cotton, the second-largest 
export, earned US$101.5m.17 
 
A challenge for small Least Developed Countries (LDCs) is to sustain high growth levels 
between mega-projects because of the shallow base of the economy. Related to this is the 
effective management of spikes in the trade balance and exchange rate volatility linked to the 
implementation of some of the large projects. Although the economic effect of a mega-project 
is spectacular in the year that it is launched, its impact understandably tapers off in the 
following years.  
3.3.3 The impact on technology transfers, industrialisation and local 
 economic development 
It is also clear that South African companies have made a meaningful contribution towards 
accelerating industrialisation and the formalisation of the private sector in many of the 
countries where they now operate. In Mozambique, their entry has led to a rapid increase of 
the contribution of industry towards GDP. The country’s economy was dominated during the 
1980s and the 1990s by the agriculture and services sectors, but the situation changed 
significantly from 1997 onwards. The contribution of agriculture to GDP decreased from   
30.5 per cent in 1996 to 19.5 per cent in 2002. In contrast, the share of industry (mostly 
related to aluminium production and the construction of the gas pipeline) has grown 
considerably during the corresponding period, from 16 per cent to 30.6 per cent (EIU 2003: 
51; IMF 2004a: 30). 
                                               
16 USAID (2004).   
17 See www.globalinsight.com. 
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Table 3.5  Mozambique: composition of GDP (in percentage of GDP), 
1998–2002 
Sector 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Agriculture 27.2 25.5 21.7 21.9 19.5 
Fishing 3.0 2.5 2.4 2.3 1.6 
Industry 21.5 22.2 23.9 24.9 30.6 
- Mining 0.3 0.1 0.4 0.4 0.3 
- Manufacturing 10.9 11.5 12.0 13.8 11.4 
- Electricity and water 2.0 2.8 2.2 2.1 3.1 
- Construction 8.3 7.7 9.3 8.7 15.9 
Services 48.3 49.8 52.0 50.9 48.2 
- Commerce 21.5 21.2 20.8 21.0 18.0 
- Retail services 0.8 0.8 0.9 0.2 0.7 
- Restaurants and hotels 1.1 1.2 1.4 1.2 1.0 
-Transport/communication 9.2 9.5 9.3 9.6 11.1 
- Financial services 2.7 2.0 3.9 3.9 3.5 
- Real estate rentals 2.3 2.2 1.9 2.4 1.5 
- Corporate services 1.3 0.9 0.8 n/a n/a 
- Government  services  5.1 6.9 7.4 7.7 6.3 
- Other services 4.3 5.1 5.5 4.9 6.2 
GDP 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
 
Source: IMF (2004a). 
 
However, Mozambique is still essentially an agriculturally based economy, and the vast 
majority of the Mozambican workforce (an estimated 8.9m) works in this sector. The 1997 
census indicated that the services sector (including government) employed only 15 per cent 
of the workforce, while industry employed about 5 per cent (see World Bank 2001: 6). 
 
The decline in the contribution of agriculture and fisheries to GDP was not only the result of 
the spectacular increase in the contribution of industry. Lower fish catches and the fall in 
international prawn prices since 2001, as well as adverse climatic conditions affecting 
agriculture, raises the spectre of uneven growth and the resultant negative impact on poverty 
reduction. The share of agriculture and fishing in relation to GDP shrank from 34.5 per cent 
in 1996 to 21.1 per cent in 2002. The export of prawns was the single most important foreign 
currency earner for Mozambique in 2000 (US$91.5m or 25 per cent of total exports), prior to 
the start-up of the Mozal smelter in mid-2000. In 2001 aluminium exports were the country’s 
largest foreign currency earner, at US$383.3m (EIU 2003: 51; IMF 2004a: 30). 
 
It is a particular challenge for the Mozambican Government to increase agricultural output 
and to develop this sector. Although Mozambique has vast tracts of arable land (estimated at 
36m hectares), only 10 per cent of it is currently in productive use. The sector still suffers 
from logistical hurdles and bottlenecks. In particular, it lacks infrastructure (access roads, 
distribution networks, production and storage facilities); tenure security; credit services; and a 
domestic agricultural industry able to provide it with the required mechanical and other inputs 
(such as fertiliser and seed). 
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Foreign investment in the sugar industry has been welcomed, because not only has South 
African and Mauritian involvement led to the rehabilitation of Mozambique’s four sugar 
estates and mills, adding to revenue and export growth, but as noted earlier the sugar 
industry has also emerged as a significant employer of Mozambicans in the agricultural 
sector. The entry of large agribusinesses has also assisted to place Mozambique’s 
agriculture sector on a more competitive footing through the development of out-grower 
schemes and the provision of important inputs such as seeds, fertiliser and finance.  
 
Other beneficial impacts have been the transfer of world-class technology. The Mozal 
smelter has the highest pot efficiency for AP30 technology in the world. Two important 
records were established during the construction phase of the smelter. The completion of the 
first phase of Mozal took place within 31 months, from approval to full commissioning, and 
came in at US$100m under budget. The second phase was completed within 26 months and 
came in at US$195m under budget. The Sasol investment in Mozambique provides a further 
spin-off in the future – a steady supply of gas to spur internal industrial growth.   
 
Another important contribution by a South African company is the focus of Absa Bank 
through its acquisition of Austral bank in Mozambique on a more active role in financial retail 
services. Foreign banks in Africa tend to focus on corporate banking and essentially structure 
their activities to service large corporate clients from their home market. The decision by 
Absa Bank to roll-out and expand its services into retail could have a beneficial impact in that 
market by making financial services much more accessible and hopefully bringing down the 
cost of financial services in the long run.   
3.3.4 The influence of South African retailers and franchising companies: a 
 mixed bag 
The impact of South African retailers on the region’s economies is far more contested. More 
than ten South African retail groups are now actively involved in the rest of Africa and are 
highly visible in individual markets.18 Certainly, one of the most positive results of the 
expansion of South African retailers has been the increase of consumer choice and a 
consistent and reliable supply of quality goods to the local consumer. A spin-off effect of 
consistent supply is the creation of price stability in African markets, although not always at 
lower levels. One of the most strident complaints by consumers is that South African 
companies are charging their regional customers higher prices for the same goods for sale in 
South Africa. However, as South African retailers pointed out during the research, the prices 
they set are a true reflection of the duties and taxes that have to be paid by traders. This 
creates a new discipline and rigour in the local pricing of goods. Formerly, formal and 
informal traders could charge whatever they wished, especially in cases where stock was 
obtained through smuggling.19  
 
However, the sector is also accused, among others, of flooding markets with South African 
products, displacing local informal markets and traders, and undermining local manufacturing 
capacity.20 Indeed, it is true that South African businesses tend to source very few products 
locally – only about 10–30 per cent of goods and inputs – and retailers offer as the reason 
                                               
18 They are Edcon, Foshini, JD Group, Massmart, Metcash, Mr Price, Nuclicks, Pepkor, Pick ’n Pay, Shoprite and Wooltru. See 
Benkenstein and Steiner (2004). 
19 South African retailers respond that they have to compete on an uneven playing field. Their operating environment is 
dominated by the informal sector and therefore highly unregulated. Many well-established and long-standing informal traders do 
not pay income tax or duties and some deal in smuggled goods. In contrast, South African retailers are obliged to pay transport 
and high storage costs (because of a low turnover rate and customs delays which force companies to maintain higher stock 
levels than in South Africa) in addition to the normal taxes and duties (interview in Mozambique, 2003). 
20 Part of the reason why South African retailers seem to flood the market with their products is the tendency of South African 
retailers and restaurant franchises to take advantage of the construction of mall complexes by South African property 
developers in partnership with local entrepreneurs such as is the case in Botswana. In each case, a large South African retailer 
has acted as an anchor tenant, and most of the commercial space has been taken up by a mix of smaller South African 
retailers, restaurants and other lessees. The highly visible concentration of South African businesses tends to enlist the criticism 
of a domineering influence in the market. 
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considerations linked to quality, cost and volume. They point out that procurement decisions 
are taken at head office level with the purpose of just-in-time delivery to markets throughout 
their global supply chains at competitive rates. The shallow manufacturing base and high 
cost structure in African markets in conjunction with hard and soft infrastructure constraints in 
many African countries makes this an almost impossible feat. Where companies are urged 
by the authorities to source more products from the local market (such as in the case of 
Botswana), South African retailers are faced with the situation that local suppliers also tend 
to import their goods from South Africa. However, in the case of goods where African 
markets do have a comparative global advantage and adhere to the highest quality 
standards, companies will source products locally, such as Ugandan and Kenyan coffee, 
which is now distributed throughout Shoprite’s global supply chain. The withdrawal of 
Shoprite from Egypt has not prevented the company from sourcing some of its goods based 
on cost considerations in that market for its West African supply chains. It is inevitable that 
South African retailers will source the highest quality goods for the lowest prices where 
possible because of the price sensitivity in the African market.  
 
What is perhaps of greater concern to some of the larger African economies, like Kenya, is 
the steady erosion of their market share in key neighbouring markets by South African 
products. The SAIIA survey found that a key concern for Kenya is South Africa’s emergence 
as a supplier of choice to its neighbours (Table 3.6).21 However, the direction of trade flows is 
largely the outcome of trade liberalisation within Africa’s many trade blocs. Kenya also faces 
stiff competition from other global players, such as producers from emerging markets like 
India and China. 
Table 3.6  Market share in the imports of seven of Kenya’s neighbours: 
DRC, Ethiopia, Rwanda, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia (percentage of 
imports originating from the listed country, period average) 
Country 1994–6 1997–9 2000–02 
Kenya 8.5 7.9  7.7 
China 2.2 4.4 5.5 
Egypt 1.8 0.9 1.2 
India 4.2 4.6 4.7 
South Africa 6.2 11.7 14.5 
 
Source: UN COMTRADE, data from importing countries. 
 
Thus, the perception that South African retail and franchising activity in the rest of Africa is 
always negative, is much more nuanced than appears at face value. However, South African 
ventures into the retail sector seem to have had a disproportionate impact on the way that 
South African investment is perceived.  
 
Another highly visible South African business presence in the region is the rapidly increasing 
number of restaurant franchises, which cater for the urban youth and the upwardly mobile 
middle class, business and donor community. Surprisingly, in contrast to investment by 
retailers, restaurant franchises are generally welcomed because they create local 
employment, transfer business skills (through capacity building and management training), 
train local chefs, and ‘produce’ meals made with some ingredients obtained locally. One of 
the most important outcomes is that these activities support small farmers and other 
agricultural producers, as already mentioned, the mainstay of most African economies.  
                                               
21 See also UN (2005: 20). 
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3.3.5 The impact on foreign and local business confidence 
One of the most intangible but important effects of South African investment has been to 
bolster the confidence of other foreign investors in the region. This is most aptly observed in 
Mozambique. The country has attracted investment from other countries steadily since 1997.  
 
Moreover, many South African companies have followed in the footsteps of their countrymen. 
This ‘tag-on’ effect has been an important factor in determining the entry of new South 
African investors and the expansion of current projects. For example, the hospitality industry 
and financial services sector have followed their clients and have expanded their presence to 
cater specifically for South African investors. The cumulative effect has not been limited only 
to South African companies servicing other South African enterprises. The entry of 
businesses from Japan, the UK and Australia with South African partners into the mega-
projects is a positive show of business confidence.  
 
Indeed, the successful implementation of mega-projects such as the Mozal smelter and the 
Sasol pipeline (within budget and the projected time frame) has had a huge impact on 
general business confidence in Mozambique. Both projects have been used to demonstrate 
Mozambique’s ability to absorb and respond to the demands and requirements of large 
investors. 
 
In Kenya, another interesting phenomenon was observed: the threat of investors from South 
Africa entering specific sectors has spurred local companies (both foreign and domestic-
owned) to improve their services and products. Thus the threat of greater competition has led 
to a more efficient allocation of resources and better services and products to customers. 
3.3.6 Limited linkages with local businesses: a passing phase? 
However, as can be gleaned from the above, clearly not all effects have been universally 
positive. The most significant failure of investment (not only South African) has been the 
relatively few linkages that have been established with the local business community. 
Although efforts have been made to address this problem, the results have been mixed. Part 
of the problem is that South African firms have high levels of knowledge specificity and are 
capital-intensive. Local companies are rarely equipped to respond to the needs of South 
African or indeed other foreign multinationals.  
 
In Mozambique, there are some positive examples of cases where linkages with local 
business were actively pursued. One is the SME Empowerment and Linkages Programme 
(SMEELP) launched by the International Finance Corporation (IFC), in cooperation with 
Mozal, to set up specific training programmes for small- and medium-sized enterprises. The 
purpose of the project was to support those companies in the local industry employed to 
work as sub-contractors on the expansion of the smelter. The mentoring and training 
programme successfully linked 12 companies to 21 contracts with Mozal at a value in excess 
of US$3m (Goldstein 2003: 28). Another example relates to the concession contract won by 
the Trans-African Concessionaires consortium in 1996 for the upgrading of N4 national 
highway from Witbank in South Africa to the Mozambican capital. The project, which was the 
first build, operate and transfer (BOT) undertaking in Mozambique, included the obligation to 
contract 40 per cent of the building work in Mozambique to local firms. The project was 
deliberately subdivided into contracts of a size that could be handled by small contractors 
(ibid.: 29). Local contractors were also employed to do the preparatory work for the laying of 
the Sasol gas pipeline in Mozambique.   
 
However, some analysts argue that in Mozambique at least, South Africa’s influence on 
domestic private investment has been fairly limited. Castel-Branco (2002: 15) states in his 
analysis that there has been no significant inducing, precluding or displacement of local 
investment because not only is domestic investment capacity poor, but even those firms that 
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have been displaced by foreign competition would in any case have been unable to continue 
their operations.  
 
The superior technology, business knowledge and (relative) financial strength of South 
African companies in the Mozambican market have also contributed to the domination of the 
local industry. While this is also the case with other foreign investors, it seems that the sheer 
volume of South African investment in the market has created resentment. Because of their 
strong presence in the local economy, South Africans have been singled out as responsible 
for the crowding out of local business. This perception requires careful management by both 
the companies involved and the South African Government. As Goldstein has pointed out, 
political opposition to FDI is not uncommon in the rest of the world. It is often the result of the 
manipulation of public opinion by groups that previously benefited from the rents created 
under previously oligarchic economic systems and who now feel threatened by more efficient 
foreign competitors (Goldstein 2003: 75). This has important implications for South African 
political engagement in the region. However, this picture has begun to change rapidly as 
other foreign investors are crowding into Africa’s small markets.    
 
Throughout all the country studies the import dependency and low procurement rate from 
local suppliers by South African multinationals were flagged as a concern. However, this 
might be a temporary phenomenon. In Mali, the local economy’s steady growth and 
increasing sophistication have made it possible for more South African firms to purchase 
goods and materials in the local market. For example, one construction company now buys 
56 per cent of its goods locally, compared to only 10 per cent a decade ago. These local 
purchases include computers, fridges, vehicle spares, furniture, food, stationery, bricks, 
stone and pipes. However, certain supplies are still obtained abroad.  
 
It seems that procurement policies are also company-specific. The procurement officer at 
one gold mine explained that the mine buys 70 per cent of its goods in South Africa. 
Although this introduces a three-week transport delay, the company concerned believes that 
the advantages offered by a reliable supply for standardised goods and stable prices are 
considerable. The remaining 30 per cent of goods bought by the same company locally 
include cars, spares, computers, stationery, some electrical and machinery items, medicines 
and food. 
 
Only time will tell whether the import dependency of South African companies will improve, 
although South African retailers in the region are demonstrating a trend in this direction. But 
clearly, in the short term, the building of large projects in some of Africa’s smaller economies 
does have a deleterious effect on the trade balance as explained earlier. However, it might 
be more useful to judge the contribution of these mega-projects (such as Mozal in 
Mozambique) against the backdrop of the government’s industrialisation policy through 
export-led growth rather than through the narrow lens of its impact on imports.  
3.4 Managing perceptions 
One of the main questions that arise is the political impact of the expansion of South African 
corporate activity into the region. For many reasons, Africa looms large on South Africa’s 
political and economic horizon. South African policymakers firmly believe that South Africa 
can only flourish in a prosperous, stable environment. At the same time, South African 
policymakers are wary of being viewed as prescriptive or overbearing in its regional 
engagement, given the historic sensitivities in Africa because of the continent’s colonial 
legacy. It is in this sensitive political context that South African companies operate. The 
interface with South African policy towards the region is clear, especially where the potential 
exists to conflate company behaviour with official government policy.22  
                                               
22 However, a presentation by former President Jaochin Chissano representing a view from the SADC region on South African 
corporate expansion into the rest of Africa, demonstrated some impatience with attempts to stereotype South African 
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However, as noted earlier, while business has been ascribed a key role in the New 
Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) initiative, the South African Government is 
not extending active financial support to South African multinationals. This hands-off 
approach and decision to allow the market to take its course is often weakly understood in 
the region.   
 
Despite the generally positive signals to the global market of South African business 
engagement with Africa, South African corporates are not received everywhere with open 
arms. Allegations of South African economic dominance and the ‘arrogant behaviour’ of 
South African companies in the region have prompted the South African Government to moot 
the idea of regulation of South African businesses in the region. However, South African 
companies also have a strong track record of adopting best practice principles in their 
regional business operations which are informed by regulation in their home market 
(Grobbelaar 2014). It is useful to look at the factors that inform the perceptions of company 
arrogance and dominance (as discussed earlier) before deciding whether further South 
African regulation is the appropriate response.  
 
The research by SAIIA found that a variety of factors have coloured the way that South 
African companies are perceived in the region apart from the obvious dominance of South 
African companies in Africa’s small markets, including the South African business style; the 
fact that South Africa is not a traditional aid donor; South Africa’s ‘unfair’ competitive 
advantage; the behaviour of individual companies; and the unintended effects of South 
African policies. These are challenges that the South African Development Partnership 
Agency (SADPA) would have to take on board if it wishes to engage the South African 
private sector much more directly in its development partnership with the region.  
3.5 Conclusion 
As can be gleaned from the above, the significance of South African investment in the region 
is undeniable. But based on the evidence it is also clear that the impact is mixed, especially 
in the short term. Indeed, a proper assessment of the costs and benefits to economies in the 
region is possible only once a comprehensive benchmarking exercise against the 
performance and impact of other foreign investors in the region (notably newcomers such as 
China, Brazil, India and Malaysia and also established investors from Europe and Russia) 
and local businesses has been undertaken.  
 
However, the preliminary evidence does show an evolving dynamic relationship with the 
region with interesting implications for private sector growth and longer-term economic 
integration. But, by all accounts for regional economic integration to flourish with the 
attendant supply chains that feed into regional production hubs of composite 
manufacturers,23 there needs to be stronger intra-trade and inter-industry trade activities. 
This has not yet sufficiently emerged in Africa, notwithstanding South African investment. 
The possibility exists that this model of development could allow the continent’s members to 
be integrated into a ‘flying geese’ model of trade and development, wherein countries with 
less advanced product structures can assume simple manufacturing and services activities 
to service supply chains of more advanced regional partners (South Africa in this instance) 
                                                                                                                                                   
engagement as necessarily negative or domineering. In responding to whether the conceptualisation of South Africa (and 
presumably corporates) as the big brother is appropriate he argues that ‘conceptualisation and analysis must and should avoid 
stereotypical conceptions of South Africa as a big brother… Both the state and its private sector are considered – and correctly 
so – as the catalysts of growth and development within and outside the sub-region. This is something that the government of 
South Africa should not shy away from’ (Chissano 2006). 
23 See UN (2004: 7), which argues that a new geography of trade is reshaping the global landscape and the South is gradually 
moving from the periphery of global trade to the centre. This phenomenon is echoed in international investment flows. A South–
South cooperation strategy could consolidate and expand this transformation and could enable the South to play a stronger role 
in driving sustained economic growth, diversification, employment and poverty reduction in its own domain. 
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as they move towards more sophisticated manufacturing and services over time.24 However, 
for that to develop a great deal more should happen to make it easier for companies across 
the continent to do business with each other.  
 
Business, and especially South African companies amongst them, can be the catalyst for the 
continent to cast off its shackles of underdevelopment. But there is a role for multiple players 
in this environment – from governments, business, labour and civil society – in ensuring that 
Africa meets its true potential. Most important amongst these is governments that work with 
the market in exercising good and responsible governance as the key to realise the 
aspiration of a better life for all on this continent.  
 
                                               
24 A similar point is made by Visser and Hartzenberg (2004) with regard to a restrictive labour policy within the SADC that has a 
similar impact on micro-firm behaviour, local markets and, eventually, market structure at a regional level. Thus, the potential 
exists that a similar pattern of industrial relocation could emerge in the SADC, following the flying geese model.  
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4  Russian business in Africa25 
 
Thirty years of Soviet presence in Africa left behind little basis for the Russian private sector 
to establish new partnerships in the continent. There is a substantially reduced scale of 
economic cooperation between the present Russian Federation and African countries when 
compared to the Soviet era. The current situation is characterised by a modest range of 
projects, implemented by African governments, firms or non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs) in cooperation with Russian mining industry companies.  
 
The main Russian stakeholder from the extractive industry sector in North African countries 
is Gazprom. In 2007, the Algerian company SONATRACH signed an agreement in which 
Gazprom Netherlands, a Gazprom subsidiary, transferred the rights to explore and produce 
hydrocarbons in the El Assel area of the Berkine Basin. Gazprom holds a 49 per cent share 
in the project, which covers the liquefied natural gas (LNG) business, ‘upstream asset 
swaps’.26  
 
Gazprom has also expressed its interest in participating in the construction of a gas pipeline 
across the Sahara Desert to establish a link between Algeria, Nigeria and Western Europe. 
The approximate cost of the project accounts for US$13bn with a deadline in 2015. 
 
The second Russian stakeholder operating in Africa is LUKOIL, which is a leader in exploring 
Egypt’s natural resources potential. The main project of LUKOIL in Egypt is West Esch El 
Mallaha (WEEM), which is implemented in the form of a concession, where the company 
currently holds a 50 per cent stake. Other stakeholders in the project are the state-owned 
EGPC (Egyptian General Petroleum Company) and the Government of Egypt. Nowadays the 
project generates a positive cash flow, and income in 2012 totalled US$14m. Another large-
scale project of LUKOIL in the region is the Meleiha field development in the Libyan Desert, 
carried out jointly with Italian ENI-Agip. The LUKOIL share in the concession accounts for   
12 per cent.27  
 
LUKOIL is also active in Ghana and Sierra Leone, which have become key destinations for 
its US$3bn overseas investment programme. The company (in the framework of a 
partnership with the US company Vanco Energy) is currently working on two projects in the 
Gulf of Guinea. 
 
The current engagement of Russian businesses with sub-Saharan African countries is 
smaller than in North Africa. Russia’s cooperation with Sudan was minimal until 2001 when 
the Sudanese Government announced that the Russian–Belarus oil company Slavneft would 
join a consortium of oil companies to fulfil its plan to double the country’s oil output by 2006.28  
 
A set of nuclear energy infrastructure development programmes are being implemented in 
Nigeria within Memoranda of Understanding (MoU) between the Nigerian authorities and 
ROSATOM with the aim of developing nuclear power plants and research reactors in Nigeria. 
The MoU covers the joint prospecting and development of uranium deposits in Nigeria 
(World Nuclear News 2012). 
 
                                               
25 Section 4 on Russia draws on a report commissioned by the RPID programme for this study: ‘Russian Business in Africa’ by 
Yuriy Zaytsev, Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration.  
26 See www.gazprom-neft.ru/press-center/news/?id=1690 (accessed 4 December 2014). 
27 LUKOIL Projects in Egypt, see www.lukoil.ru/static.asp?id=82 (accessed 4 December 2014). 
28 See MEED (2002). 
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When preparing the current study, the Russian business people and government officials 
interviewed frequently claimed that the main barrier for expansion of private investments in 
developing countries (and particularly Africa) is a poor investment climate. According to 
them, the situation has worsened after the global financial and economic crisis in 2008–09. 
Less often, and never in public, there was recognition that Russian Government and 
businesses lack the experience and capacity to be effective partners with regard to 
developmental objectives and even to risk large investments in Africa. Therefore, the trend is 
for Russian firms to invest in middle-income or OECD countries.  
4.1 Government support for Russian business to invest in 
 developing countries  
At the current stage, the Government of the Russian Federation undertakes a wide range of 
measures to support Russian business abroad. Diplomatic cooperation is one of those 
mechanisms, applied to promote Russian business, which faces aggressive competition at 
the foreign markets. Nowadays, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation has 
concluded cooperation agreements with LUKOIL, Norilsk Nikel, Vnesheconombank, 
Association of Russian Banks and other companies (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the 
Russian Federation 2010).  
 
However, diplomatic cooperation is not enough to support Russian business in developing 
markets. Public–private partnership (PPP) and CSR are mechanisms which could 
complement existing and future development assistance programmes implemented by 
Russia and other international donors, as well as provide socioeconomic effects to support 
business activity.  
4.1.1 Public–private partnership 
PPP is one of the most effective mechanisms to expand the scale of Russian business 
engagement in governmental projects associated with international development assistance. 
PPP-relevant projects encompass enormous potential to contribute to achieving the 
Millennium Development Goals by 2015 and the implementation of the international 
development agenda as a whole.29 What is more, cooperation with the private sector is one 
form of implementation of the Monterrey Consensus, focused on diversification of 
development finance (UN 2003).  
 
There are three main advantages of PPP use in international development cooperation. First, 
PPP solves the problem of inefficiency associated with governmental regulation and market 
failures, and reduces the risks related to financing development programmes. Second, PPP 
is a new way to unite the resources and competencies of traditional and new development 
actors, which allows them to share the risks and benefits of development cooperation 
projects. Third, PPP projects create added value through the optimisation and synergy of 
joint cooperation. The application of PPP instruments contributes to the emergence of the 
unique product, addressing the needs of the poorest countries in the short and long term. 
Participation of business in socially oriented programmes in the fields of education, health 
and infrastructure also strengthens the investment climate in the region.  
 
It is important to underline that there is a strong tendency to transform the traditional forms of 
PPP into multilateral partnerships, uniting public sector, business and NGOs. This tendency 
is a result of the complexity of international development cooperation, which implies different 
purposes of the economic development of the poorest nations. Multilateral partnerships also 
reduce the risks of a project’s failure and contribute to consistency of development project 
results in the long term. 
 
                                               
29 See United Nations Millennium Development Goals (www.un.org/millenniumgoals/). 
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4.1.2 Corporate social responsibility 
Another direction of Russian business participation in development assistance programmes 
is CSR. From a business perspective, the implementation of CSR-relevant projects is one of 
the main instruments to reduce social risks and to maintain client loyalty. It is why CSR 
projects implemented by businesses in developing countries often coincide with the activity 
of the donors in recipient countries. In international practice, the implementation of CSR 
projects in developing countries is associated with the realisation of international principles, 
regulating socially responsible finance, as recommended by the World Bank, IMF and 
regional development banks.  
 
The reality is that Russian businesses are substantially lacking in the practice of socially 
responsible finance. This can be attributed to the absence of a CSR culture among Russian 
companies and the shortage of national regulation of CSR programmes and socially 
responsible investments. The existing environmental requirements do not always meet the 
standards of foreign investors, such as the IFC. These factors constitute serious barriers for 
Russian firms to invest abroad and particularly in developing countries. 
 
To overcome these barriers, Russian businesses need to expand their cooperation with 
Russian and foreign NGOs that possess greater knowledge and experience in engaging with 
the problems of the poorest population in developing countries. Microcredit in developing 
countries also needs to be expanded as this type of credit often relates to solving ecological 
and social issues at the local level.     
4.1.3 Perspectives from Russian stakeholders on the role of CSR in Russian 
 businesses abroad 
Several Russian stakeholders representing business, NGOs and the academic community 
were interviewed on the role of Russian business in developing countries. The interviews 
were semi-structured with special emphasis on Russian investments and development 
partnerships in Africa.  
 
The interviews revealed that Russian firms in developing countries are mostly represented by 
large companies, both private such as LUKOIL and RUSAL, and companies with a 
substantial share of state-owned capital (for example, Gazprom and ROSATOM). Russian 
medium and small businesses are under-represented in such markets. Smaller businesses 
usually provide services for the large Russian companies operating in developing countries 
in Africa in the field of extractive industries. It is also common practice for large firms to 
acquire smaller businesses that provide essential services for their value chains.  
 
The challenge to arrange effective cooperation frameworks with local and foreign 
businesses, as well as with the local governments and local communities in developing 
countries, was often mentioned. However, the main driver for Russian business presence in 
developing countries is profit and partnerships were viewed as key to providing stability for 
business operations.  
 
Large Russian companies reported that generally they do not have to compete in the mining 
sector in Africa as they occupy their own niches, which originated as a mode of development 
assistance provided by the Soviet Union (the cases of Guinea and Nigeria) or as a result of 
oligopolistic market power distribution. The example of oligopolistic power distribution is 
projects where RUSAL cooperates with Chinese companies in the field of mining.  
 
Some Russian companies, such as Gazprom, often do not have any regional competitors – 
which is also true with respect to other BRICS countries. There are no crossing points with 
countries such as China, Brazil, India and South Africa in the field of gas extraction and 
transportation in Africa. What is more, none of the other BRICS countries export gas from 
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Russia: it is logistically impossible to export the gas to South Africa and Brazil; China uses oil 
and coal in its industrial production; and there were no negotiations with India regarding gas 
export from Russia. 
 
Gazprom does not coordinate its activity with OECD countries. There is no single gas global 
market and it is worth distinguishing regional gas markets. Gazprom is either the main or the 
only producer of gas in the regions where it operates. It is even harder to integrate within the 
markets of other countries because of technical and transportation limitations. That is why 
the only formal forum for gas companies to coordinate their activities is the Global Forum of 
Gas Exporters, which cannot meet the demands of all stakeholders simultaneously.  
 
The situation in terms of regional diversification could be changed if Gazprom starts 
exporting LNG. Such work is already ongoing in Sakhalin (Russian Far Eastern province) 
oriented towards Japan and South Korea, with both countries buying Russian LNG.     
 
The absence of a unique strategy can be also explained by the institutional factor. There are 
many governmental stakeholders in the field of regulating the mining industries in Russia, 
most of which originated in Soviet Union days and were inherited by modern Russia. There 
have been a number of international programmes aiming to restructure the industry – for 
instance, the World Bank granted a loan to this end to the Russian Federation – but despite 
being restructured, they have not improved the businesses’ approach to development.   
4.2 CSR practices in Russian businesses 
CSR is not new to Russia. However, the concept is vague for Russian business and it is 
understood in different ways depending on where the projects are implemented – in Russia 
or abroad. Russian businesses do not usually use the term ‘CSR’ for the projects realised in 
the Russian Federation; the word ‘charity’ is more applicable. Such projects with local 
communities are effective in promoting a company’s image. 
 
Most of the Russian companies in Russia launch CSR programmes because of the need to 
compete with other companies in the same markets. However, CSR projects are also 
associated with networking, which is key in a society where contracts can be adjudicated in a 
less than transparent manner  
 
The approach to CSR projects by Russian businesses operating abroad is very different to 
CSR/charity projects implemented in the Russian Federation. The big Russian businesses 
got used to calling them ‘CSR’ projects in response to the international standard of CSR set 
by Western countries, and companies such as LUKOIL, Gazprom and RUSAL use the term 
when operating in developing countries.  
 
CSR programmes have become unavoidable for Russian businesses operating abroad 
primarily because of international standards. These practices are associated not only with 
stories of doing good for the local communities, but also with generating profit for business in 
this area. Such programmes help businesses to create a conducive investment environment 
and to prepare a skilled workforce to adequately meet the demands of the business in the 
field.  
 
CSR programmes are a great challenge for Russian companies operating abroad. Usually 
the success of Russian business and CSR projects depends on a company’s relationship 
with the local government. A change of government can influence business activities, 
sometimes to the extent that the government may want a business to be expropriated.  
 
Financial provision for CSR projects varies from company to company. In general, the main 
source of funding for CSR projects is derived from public relations budgets and the 
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importance of CSR depends on the individual company’s policy. What is more, in many 
Russian companies the CSR programme budget depends on the allocation of company 
profits by the board of directors. Not all companies are interested in allocating substantial 
resources to finance their CSR projects. If the board of directors supports them, it is likely 
that the company will implement CSR projects, conjunct with its business. If the business 
deals with the environment, it usually implements CSR projects to help decrease the 
negative influence on the environment.   
 
If the local government fails to provide basic services to communities, such as heating, 
medical services, etc., the CSR programmes implemented by the business can fill in this 
gap. The CSR of a business can also be associated with programmes implemented in 
cooperation with NGOs, which can deliver projects favourable to local communities (see   
Box 4.1).  
 
Box 4.1  The case of RUSAL 
RUSAL, which is a public but not state-owned enterprise, is investing substantial amounts of 
resources to train Guineans at Russian universities in order to prepare a skilled workforce in 
engineering disciplines. This is financed by the company itself with no support from the government. 
The CSR and related practices are implemented not only in developing countries, but also in 
countries with a high GDP per capita. For example, in Italy and Ireland, where RUSAL also operates, 
social work is a part of the role of the employee. CSR projects are implemented only in cases where 
they address the needs and provide assistance to local communities in the fields of education, health 
and infrastructure.  
 
RUSAL is implementing CSR projects in developing countries such as Guinea, Jamaica, Guyana and 
Nigeria. The company has been operating in Guinea for over a decade and during this time it has 
become the country’s largest foreign employer. RUSAL supports the development of Guinean sports 
and culture, constructs social infrastructure facilities, runs projects for young people’s professional 
training and reinforces cross-cultural relations between Russia and Guinea through educating 
Guinean students at the best universities in Russia. Details of RUSAL’s CSR projects in Guinea are 
given below. 
 
With respect to infrastructure development, RUSAL implements a wide range of projects associated 
with water and electricity supply, construction of schools and the repair of infrastructure. 
 
Supplying water and electricity to the city of Fria 
The shortage of water and electricity is one of the most pressing challenges for the residents of Fria. 
RUSAL uses the capacities of its Friguia bauxite and alumina complex to ensure a continuous supply 
of drinking water and electricity to the local residents. In areas where access to water is inhibited, 
RUSAL constructs artesian wells. 
 
Construction of a secondary school in Fria 
Fria, where RUSAL’s facilities are located, has an insufficient number of schools, which are located 
some distance from the RUSAL complex. The company has constructed a state school for the 
underprivileged children of Fria. 
 
Repairing Fria swimming pool 
RUSAL’s Friguia bauxite and alumina complex is equipped with a swimming pool. This is one of the 
country’s three swimming pools and once it has been repaired, it will be not only a comfortable 
leisure place for RUSAL’s employees, but also an extra venue for the annual sports competitions 
arranged by the National Olympic Committee of Guinea and the Swimming Federation. 
 
 
(Cont’d). 
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Box 4.1 (Cont’d). 
Supporting cultural heritage 
RUSAL deeply respects the culture of Guinea, where the majority of the population are religious. The 
company is currently restoring a city mosque and a catholic church in Fria. 
 
The Martial Arts Centre, constructed by Pechiney in 1968, is a popular leisure place for Guineans 
and expats living in the country. Repair of the centre will help to save the main sports venue in the 
city and restore the tradition of international sports tournaments. 
 
Scholarships for Guinean students 
In 2011, RUSAL launched its educational programme, RUSAL Scholarship 2011, which provides for 
100 talented young Guineans to be educated in Russia’s best universities. All accommodation, 
transportation costs and tuition fees are covered by RUSAL. Guinean students are able to study for 
degrees in mining, railroad operations, economics, building and construction, agriculture, water 
supply, medicine and human resources. After graduation, there is the opportunity for many of the 
students to work for RUSAL in their subsidiaries in Guinea. 
 
International Educational Programme   
RUSAL’s large-scale educational programme is allocated US$5.5m in resources and extends to 
young people from Guinea, Jamaica and Guyana.30 The main objective of the programme is to 
prepare specialists in the mining industry who could work at the company’s factories. The programme 
assumes that the students (aged 18–25) will study at the leading universities of the Russian 
Federation in Moscow and in Yekaterinburg. All the costs associated with each student’s study 
abroad are covered by RUSAL and after graduation the company trains and employs them at its 
factories in their home country. 
 
The educational programme is a vital component of RUSAL’s CSR in these countries where it works. 
The training of skilled national labour is needed to raise the efficiency of the production process, as 
well as to increase the number of local specialists. In addition, the training of the national labour force 
contributes to the socioeconomic development of the poorest countries in Africa and Latin America 
where the company works. This is also a strengthening factor in the economic and political 
relationships between Russia and these countries. 
 
In 2011, 100 students from Guinea were studying in Russia and during 2011–16, five students from 
Jamaica and five students from Guyana will study economics and mining at the People’s Friendship 
University of Russia. RUSAL’s educational programme for Guinea is therefore the biggest. The 
programme for training Guineans as specialists in the fields of economics, mining, medicine, 
engineering, agriculture and water supply as a priority is explained by the fact that RUSAL extracts 
about 40 per cent of the total volume of the country’s natural resources. 
Source: Interview and RUSAL’s website (www.rusal.ru/en/). 
 
 
A special approach for managing CSR practices can be identified for Russian gas extraction 
companies. It is important to distinguish CSR practices realised by such companies in 
regions/countries where it extracts the gas from those that are implemented by companies 
involved in transporting the gas.  
 
There are a wide range of CSR-related projects in Russia where a company extracts gas. 
The case of Gazprom demonstrates a high degree of compliance with international 
environmental standards. With growing expectations that the leading industrial companies 
should redouble efforts to protect nature and comply with international environmental 
standards, Gazprom is implementing international regulations, such as United Nations Global 
Compact and Equator principles. 
 
                                               
30 See www.rusal.ru/career/edu.aspx (accessed 4 December 2014). 
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CSR relating to gas transportation projects deals more with compliance with international 
environment protection standards. Natural gas is the cleanest fuel from an environmental 
point of view and modern, energy-efficient equipment can burn gas with high efficiency and 
minimal emissions, including that of carbon dioxide which causes the greenhouse effect. 
Gazprom undertakes measures to comply with the Kyoto Protocol and the Copenhagen 
Accord principles, which are aimed at gradually reducing carbon dioxide emissions into the 
atmosphere and provide a market for trading these emissions. Gazprom’s subsidiary 
company Gazprom Marketing & Trading, based in the UK, contributes to promoting and 
implementing these standards worldwide. 
 
With respect to gas delivery, Gazprom conducts a series of projects to support the gas 
transportation network. These projects usually assume collaboration with the foreign and 
international authorities where the gas transport networks are located. Extrapolation of the 
gas leakage measurement results indicates that across the Gazprom Group’s pipelines, 
including production facilities, the total loss of gas is only about 1 per cent. This low indicator 
of loss is why the supply of ‘blue fuel’ has a minimal environmental impact.  
 
Generally, the transportation of gas does not affect local communities as much as extraction 
because the gas pipes are located in special zones and are operated under the special 
regulations of the local authorities. Hence, not so many CSR projects are implemented. 
However, as a global company, Gazprom has to comply with international standards with 
respect to digging activities.  
4.3 How Russian businesses view risk when operating in Africa  
Russian businesses are wary of a wide range of risks in the markets of African countries, 
which are perceived as being extremely severe for Russian businesses working in the mining 
industries. Most of the risks are associated with the poor investment climate in African 
countries, as discussed. However, there is a set of primary risks for Russian businesses 
indicated by the Russian stakeholders. 
 
The most important risk for Russian business in African countries is still commercial risk. 
Such risk is mainly associated with returns on investment flows, which are identified by such 
factors as circumstances of insuperable force, transportation and paying capacity. Currently, 
Russian businesses in Africa are reducing the volume of their investment projects in the 
extractive industries, mainly because of lack of operations efficiency and low profit gains. 
 
Russian mining companies operating in Africa have less competitive infrastructure in 
comparison with their partners from OECD countries and China. Russian businesses are 
falling behind in bringing new technologies and new methods of doing business to capture 
the markets of developing countries in Africa. Russian companies are substantially lacking 
industrial and managerial innovations.  
 
What is more, Russian companies are suffering from the consequences of geopolitics and 
lack the position gained by the Soviet Union. Weak geopolitical positioning is not only due to 
a smaller physical presence of Russian stakeholders in Africa but also the issue of 
insufficient cultural ties. Previously, leaders of African countries were graduates from Soviet 
universities; now they are succeeded by young elites educated at universities in the US, UK, 
Canada, etc. 
 
The second most important risk is the integration of new regulations into business operations 
at both the national and international level.  
 
Another risk is labour movements, which Russian companies often face within African 
countries. For instance, in Guinea and Nigeria RUSAL has had to invest substantial 
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resources in order to stabilise the situation and reach agreements with both labour 
movements and the national NGOs. NGOs’ activity is the main instrument to keep labour 
movements from becoming too radical. So, cooperation with the communities and 
establishing stable relations with them is one of the strategic priorities in managing this kind 
of risk. 
 
An additional risk is political instability, which can exert substantial influence on the economic 
cycles of local companies. Of course, Russian companies in the extraction industries are too 
huge to fear such risk because they can always diversify with different projects elsewhere in 
the world. 
 
The work of Russian companies on investment climate improvement in developing countries 
of Africa is one mechanism to help overcome risks associated with the business 
environment. The main international business instruments to improve investment climate are 
CSR and PPP. A special focus should be made on PPP as a new mechanism in mobilising 
resources for development needs and investment climate improvement. 
4.4 Lack of capacity within Russian companies hinders their 
 cooperation with local communities in Africa 
International experience demonstrates that no single community in developing regions gains 
sufficient support from the donors who come to where they live – otherwise, they would not 
have the many socioeconomic problems they now have. For Russia, this applies to both 
Russian and foreign local communities.  
 
There are a lot of communities in Russia, but the CSR project budgets allocated by Russian 
companies are not enough to meet the demands of them all. In particular cities and towns 
Russian companies are helping communities to overcome the problems inherited from Soviet 
Union times, such as mono towns (or single factory towns) where the population worked for 
many years at a few factories to produce particular products.  
 
As mentioned in Section 4.2, Russian companies usually use the word ‘charity’ instead of the 
term ‘CSR’. The charity programmes of many Russian companies are more developed in 
Russia than abroad. For example, Gazprom is actively carrying out charity projects aimed 
at helping children with disabilities. These projects are implemented on a long-term basis and 
involve a comprehensive approach to the treatment and rehabilitation of children. The Naked 
Heart Foundation is one of the main partners and works to enable children with autism 
spectrum disorders, who have pronounced communication disorders, intellectual disability 
and behavioural disorders, to study in school. The main focus is on training teachers working 
at special schools in the principles of teaching such children in Russia.31 
 
There is a multitude of other problems, which both Russian companies and governments are 
failing to solve. In these cases the businesses usually prefer to ignore the problems and 
hope they will go away on their own.  
 
Of course, some problems exist in developing countries where Gazprom either provides or 
extracts gas but were not directly caused by its operations. For instance, in one case 
Greenpeace claimed that Gazprom’s activities were linked with the global problem of carbon 
dioxide emissions. However, Gazprom is not the only contributor; it is itself a global problem.  
 
With respect to Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) countries, there are no 
community development programmes which could help Russian business to overcome the 
                                               
31 For the geography of the Naked Heart Foundation, see www.nakedheart.org/en/where-we-work/ (accessed 4 December 
2014). 
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local institutional barriers. Most Russian businesses are interested in gaining profits from the 
local markets. Even though there are many social problems in CIS countries, the CSR 
programmes of Russian businesses are not always associated with social programmes 
addressing the needs of communities. However, often a business is allowed to implement its 
activities when it has agreed in return to meet certain demands made by the local 
government. Russian companies in these countries therefore have to agree to certain 
conditions in order to protect their business. Affiliated companies implement CSR projects, 
as agreed with the governments. Sometimes the local communities are dropped from the 
projects and their opinion is not considered during the planning stages. 
 
Generally, NGOs are effective in assisting Russian businesses to implement their CSR 
activities not only in Russia, but also abroad. One of the most effective ways to improve the 
practice of CSR project implementation is to promote successful experiences of this type of 
cooperation between Russian businesses and NGOs.  
4.5  The role of the Russian Government in assisting Russian 
 businesses in developing countries of Africa 
Russian businesses and the government are not two different actors when dealing with 
Russian business abroad. For Russian business abroad it is very important to have 
information and jurisprudence support in the countries where they are operating. Such 
cooperation implies a permanent process of decision-making that takes into consideration 
the positions of different stakeholders. What is more, new international regulations (including 
the WTO norms) require Russian businesses to work closely with the Russian Government, 
which is providing more and more significant support abroad. 
 
Generally, Russian business programmes oriented towards the needs of local communities 
do not always meet their socioeconomic needs. In such a situation it would be useful for 
Russia to follow China, which unites CSR programmes with the relevant overseas 
development assistance (ODA) programmes initiated by the Chinese authorities. China 
operates in African countries not only from an economic perspective, but also from the point 
of view of cultural values. Chinese authorities provide a wide range of training and 
educational programmes in Chinese for the local population. This is a good example of how 
the soft power of the Chinese Government is supporting national business abroad. The 
Russian authorities could also follow China by launching combined business and 
government programmes to meet the needs of the poorest countries associated with 
socioeconomic development. 
 
The idea of PPPs in the field of development assistance was widely discussed by the 
stakeholders from government, business, academia and NGOs. On the one hand, the 
government can boost Russian businesses’ awareness of the economic advantages 
associated with doing business in Africa. On the other hand, PPPs are more relevant 
mechanisms, which could contribute to increasing the efficiency of the ODA resources 
provided by the Russian Government to developing countries in Africa. 
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5  How do Chinese and Indian businesses 
 compare? A brief review of the literature  
 
Over the last few years, Chinese and Indian investment in Africa has boosted bilateral trade, 
increased the competitiveness of the continent and promoted African economic growth. As a 
proxy for ‘progressive’ involvement in development, literature on CSR has been examined to 
find out whether Chinese and Indian firms have gone beyond the ‘traditional’ role of business 
in development and whether their practices abide by South–South cooperation principles.  
 
The examination of CSR strategies of Chinese and Indian firms in Africa has thrown up 
mixed results. On the one hand, the influence of Chinese companies on improving the 
infrastructure across Africa to energise trade links within the region cannot be overstated. 
India has been a crucial player that is providing human resources training and technology to 
the region. However, companies from both countries have also reportedly been engaged in 
poor business practices that carry a negative impact in Africa. This section gives an overview 
of the main business features of both countries with Africa; it then provides an assessment of 
the positive and negative activities of these Asian firms in Africa; and finally, it compares the 
findings with the CSR practices of China and India with the Brazilian, Russian and South 
African firms. 
5.1  China in Africa: all about resources?  
A growing body of literature is drawing attention to the nature of Sino–African relationships, 
especially to the commercial and diplomatic links that China maintains in Africa. Whereas 
Africa has been depicted by the West as an aid recipient and a place of disease and poverty, 
China has advanced since the early 1980s with a more pragmatic approach (Brautigam 
2009). The fact that China is a developing country and presents itself as a business partner 
rather than a donor has been an appealing rhetoric that has deepened the ‘South–South’ 
bonds with Africa (ibid.). Bilateral trade grew nearly tenfold between 1996 and 2005 (Lihua 
2006)32 and by the end of 2013, it had dramatically risen to US$210bn, making China Africa’s 
biggest business partner (BBC 2014).  
 
Although it has been reported that there are an estimated 800 state-owned companies 
operating in different African countries, Chinese authorities maintain secret the total number 
and the nature of Chinese firms abroad, especially in conflict-sensitive countries (Raine 
2009). A large proportion of Chinese business in Africa is strongly grounded in the extraction 
of resources, as nearly 80 per cent of Chinese imports are mineral products (The Economist 
2013b). Oil is the main business sector in which solely Chinese state-owned companies33 are 
investing, whereas a growing number of private firms are investing in the African mining 
sector (Taylor 2006). The latter are securing the exploitation of minerals such as copper, 
bauxite, uranium, aluminium, manganese and iron ore, gas and other resources (ibid.: 938).  
 
However, it would be a mistake to consider that Chinese relationships with Africa are 
exclusively resource-driven (Raine 2009). The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 
noted in 2012 that Chinese investments cover more than 49 African countries in diverse 
sectors such as manufacturing (46 per cent), including textiles (15 per cent), mining           
(28 per cent), services (18 per cent) and agriculture (7 per cent) (Jafrani 2012).  
                                               
32 Statistics from the Chinese customs show that in 1996 Sino–African trade totalled US$4.03bn and in 2005 bilateral trade 
closed with US$40bn.  
33 The three biggest Chinese oil companies in Africa are the China National Petroleum and Chemical Corporation, the China 
National Petroleum Corporation, and the China National Offshore Oil Corporation. 
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By the same token, Chinese firms control a vast share of the African infrastructure projects, 
and have access to important sectors such as telecommunications, transport, power plants, 
waste disposal and construction (Broadman 2007, 2008). In particular, Chinese 
multinationals are carrying out construction projects that range from large to small scale in  
35 African countries, mostly funded by the China Exim (Export–Import) Bank (Mohan and 
Tan-Mullins 2009). Indeed, some small Chinese firms hold a monopoly of the engineering 
and construction markets in countries such as Angola, Equatorial Guinea and Côte d’Ivoire 
due to the lack of financial and technical capacity of local companies (Raine 2009; Chen et 
al. 2007). However, this is not to suggest that China’s engagement in the continent is entirely 
negative. These firms are building hospitals, dams, government offices, stadiums, power 
plants, airports and railways, and revamping infrastructure abandoned by Western 
companies across the continent and even reconstructing entire urban cities (Taylor 2006; 
Kaplinsky, McCormick and Morris 2007). This engagement has had a great potential to 
revitalise trade development between countries whose deficient infrastructure and major 
transport routes have discouraged foreign investment (Gadzala 2010). By at least one of the 
criteria for ‘traditional’ development approaches, Chinese businesses by and large can claim 
to be boosting local economies by investing in infrastructure. However, other ‘traditional’ 
criteria such as generating more local employment and more tax revenue for the government 
may still be in their initial stages. 
5.2 A profile of Chinese businesses in Africa 
There are three major reasons that explain the engagement of Chinese firms with Africa. 
First, they started by supporting development projects which helped to familiarise them with 
African markets; they apply this knowledge to develop further niches for investment (Gu 
2009). Second, protectionist trade restrictions imposed by the US and the European Union 
over a number of Chinese manufacturers have motivated the latter to set up businesses in 
Africa and evade these restrictions by changing the country of origin of their products (ibid.). 
This strategy allows Chinese enterprises – under preferential trade agreements with Africa – 
to regain access to North American and European markets. Third, the need to both secure its 
long-term domestic supplies for energy and secure a leading position in the global oil market 
explains the intense commercial activity of China with Africa (Taylor 2006).      
 
The main characteristic of Chinese firms – especially in extractive industries – is that they are 
vertical and capital intensive (Alden and Davies 2006). This means that they integrate 
themselves into well-defined markets acquiring upstream assets to secure commodities 
(CFR 2007). And most importantly, Chinese firms are largely state financed (Sirohi 2008). 
This capacity allows them to maintain a disproportionate advantage to outbid rival companies 
and obtain procurement contracts in Africa, due to the long-term capital and political support 
they receive from the Chinese Government (Broadman 2008).  
 
Chinese firms in Africa tend to obtain their supplies from China rather than local markets 
(ibid.), especially in the construction sector. Evidence from a study of Chinese construction 
firms in North Africa highlights that Chinese contractors prefer to import materials from their 
home country: ‘In many African countries, their building material supply and equipment do 
not reach our demand and standards. Most of the material and equipment are from outside 
the host country’ (Chen et al. 2007: 459). However, the reasons are just as likely to be 
grounded in the lower prices of Chinese-made materials rather than quality (see Chen et al. 
2007).   
 
Moreover, Chinese firms rarely promote the integration of their workers into the African 
socioeconomic milieu (Broadman 2008), an issue that rarely attracts academic attention. In 
order to understand this behaviour it is necessary to incorporate the concept of 
‘embeddedness’ into the analysis of Chinese business culture in the region (Mohan and Tan-
Mullins 2009). This concept is useful to analyse the levels of integration of migrant workers, 
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belonging to one particular ethnic/racial group in a particular cultural and socioeconomic 
environment, and the reactions in the host society towards them (ibid.).  
 
Cultural misconceptions, linguistic barriers and stereotypes are salient issues in the images 
of both groups. Chinese entrepreneurs prefer to focus on working directly with local 
governments and bring business practices that discourage integration of their workers into 
the African life (ibid.). In particular, Chinese firms prefer to bring their own workforce for a 
fixed period, openly discriminate against African workers and are hostile to labour unions and 
labour rights34 (Gong 2007: 2). In addition, these firms prevent Chinese workers from forging 
personal relationships with local people35 (Gong 2007).  
 
On the other hand, Africans view the Chinese presence with mixed feelings (The Economist 
2011). Many African countries suffer from high unemployment rates and labour unions 
encourage Chinese companies to hire more local labour (Pegg 2012). Similarly, the growing 
competition from the Chinese textile firms has affected negatively the local textiles industries. 
This issue has contributed to thousands of job losses in Kenya, Lesotho, Nigeria and South 
Africa (ibid.). The main reason is that Chinese firms rely on a pool of low-wage Chinese 
workers who are willing to work under difficult conditions (Cheng and Liang 2011). 
Nevertheless, numerous labour rights organisations are accusing Chinese firms of taking 
away job opportunities, hoarding their natural resources, deepening local corruption and 
violating African labour laws (The Economist 2011). As a result, African resentment towards 
the Chinese workforce has been visible in several episodes and even deadly clashes.36  
5.3  CSR of Chinese firms in Africa 
There is scant academic attention towards the analysis of CSR practices of Chinese firms in 
the region. This concept refers to companies’ strategies of social responsibility, social 
responsiveness, policies, programmes and the impact of this approach on society (Wood 
1991). However, CSR is a relatively new concern in China and the government has not 
energetically advocated its implementation (Lin 2010). The reason seems to be grounded in 
its novelty and the alleged poor business etiquette of Chinese firms abroad (Cheng and 
Liang 2011). The corporate understanding of China about CSR practices gives less 
importance to community engagement and social responsibility, while prioritising the 
inclusion of sustainable environmental practices in their agendas. This is due to fears of 
liability, which is an urgent concern for Chinese firms in Africa (Roe 2014). 
 
Besides labour-related poor practices, the environment is the area with the largest number of 
scandals that involve Chinese firms in Africa (Tan-Mullins and Mohan 2013). The country’s 
operations have violated environmental regulations in many African countries (The 
Economist 2011). For example, state-owned oil companies have been seeking oil in national 
parks in Gabon and investing in the oil industry of complex regimes such as Sudan, where 
lakes of spilled crude have even been created (ibid.). The Chinese Government has 
addressed concerns about the negative image and irresponsible performance of its firms by 
enforcing the inclusion of CSR in the agendas of Chinese businesses.  
 
For instance, since 2006 the Corporation Law of China requires companies to embrace 
social responsibility (Cheng and Liang 2011). Similarly, since 2008 the Guidelines for Central 
State-Owned-Enterprises (SOEs) Regarding Implementation of Corporate Social 
                                               
34 In 2010, two Chinese managers shot 11 Zambian miners over a pay dispute (see BBC 2010). Also, Mauritius witnessed a 
Chinese female workers’ strike against their bosses due to wage delinquency, rude treatment and being forced to work          
14–16 hours a day, seven days a week (Gong 2007: 2). 
35 It has been reported that Chinese companies ‘forbid workers, mostly males, to have any relationship with local women, 
arguing that this system will prevent the contraction of AIDS or other STDs [sexually transmitted diseases]’ (Gong 2007: 1).   
36 In 2012, Zambian miners killed a Chinese supervisor under allegations of abuses and underpayment (see The Guardian 
2012). And in southern Nigeria, Chinese workers in the oil industry have become the target of crime and kidnapping (Gong 
2007).   
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Responsibility compel firms abroad to ‘achieve the harmony between enterprises’ growth, 
society and environment’ (ibid.). Currently, Chinese firms are under the supervision of the 
State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC) in Beijing (Tan-
Mullins and Mohan 2013). 
 
Moreover, there is evidence that Chinese firms are embracing CSR in their policies.  
Since its first project in Africa in 1997, Huawei Technology has hired over 65 per cent of its 
total staff from Africa, having created over 10,000 jobs indirectly. Huawei also set up six 
training centres across the continent which provide training to 12,000 African engineers and 
workers every year.  
 
Sinohydro invested US$900m in 30 projects in Angola, including hydropower, agriculture, 
hospitals, schools and transportation. It has trained and employed over 8,200 local workers. 
In 2010, China Nonferrous Metal Mining Group Co. (CNMC) donated ZMK30m to Kalulushi 
City Health Department to help the Zambian Government and medical institute promote 
malaria prevention in the area. 
 
China Road and Bridge Corporation signed an agreement with Changsha University of 
Science and Technology on ‘Training Angolan Students in China’. It also funded 34 Angolan 
students to study civil engineering in China and bring their knowledge back to Africa (Cheng 
and Liang 2011; Carter Center China Program 2011). 
 
China Railway Group Ltd promoted the Environmental Friendly Enterprise Scheme, planted 
more than 10,000 trees in Africa, cleansed (from pollution) 16,000 hectares of farmland to 
make it fit for farming again and constructed more than 2,000 water wells for the Republic of 
Mali (Cheng and Liang 2011; Carter Center China Program 2011). 
 
However, one of the most common criticisms about the implementation of CSR in Africa is 
that Chinese companies often donate money or equipment to communities in an inefficient 
manner (Roe 2014). This phenomenon has been linked to poor engagement of the Chinese 
companies with the local communities, which does not address the real needs of local 
groups. Rather, the companies address the problems that they perceive to be key. It could 
be argued that Western firms have also been known for deciding what is best for their host 
communities and that only the most progressive of firms engage in truly participatory 
processes with the community. Furthermore, Chinese CSR activities lack public campaigning 
and advertising as they advocate that ‘actions speak louder than words’ (Cheng and Liang 
2011). Another major drawback is that CSR policies are often determined by the 
headquarters of a state agency in China. Additionally, the lack of social demands emerging 
from African communities also makes it difficult to stop irresponsible environmental practices 
in the region. Currently, there are no African official institutions that specialise in monitoring 
the CSR practices of Chinese firms in Africa (Tan-Mullins and Mohan 2013). Only the 
Chinese headquarters of the SASAC supervises the performance of its firms. This reduces 
the engagement of host communities and local stakeholders to demand higher standards of 
responsible practices by Chinese firms. Conversely, in the next section, we explain that India 
seems to be implementing a radically different way of conducting business and promoting 
sustainable development in Africa.  
5.4 Indian business and African engagement: the softer 
 approach  
India’s engagement with Africa has been described as the middle ground between the 
‘aggressive’ expansion of Chinese firms and the ‘strings-attached’ Western aid in Africa 
43 
 
(Taylor 2012). The involvement of India in the region is not a recent phenomenon.37 The 
intense commercial trade between the two began during the 1990s (Broadman 2007, 2008). 
Correspondingly, these links are rooted under South–South cooperation bonds (Alvarenga, 
Jansson and Naidu 2009). The sectors in which Indian firms are engaged in Africa range 
from mining, energy, telecommunications, information technology (IT) services, agriculture 
and pharmaceutics (WTO 2013). Bilateral Indian–African trade has grown by nearly            
32 per cent annually between 2005 and 2011 and is expected to rise up to US$90bn by 2015 
(WTO 2013).38 Notwithstanding, the data of the total Indian investment in Africa are vague.  
 
A primary concern for India is the need for energy. Currently, India has one-fifth of the 
world’s population (over one billion) and is the sixth country with the biggest need for energy 
(Singh 2007). In order to enhance its partnership with resource-rich countries, India has 
promoted the Techno-economic Approach for Africa–India Movement (Team-9) to secure 
energy sources in West Africa (ibid.). Besides, multinational firms have a substantial interest 
in seeking for gold, diamonds, manganese, bauxite, iron ore and chrome in the region either 
by opening new mines or making alliances with local companies (Mawdsley and McCann 
2011) 
 
While Chinese entrepreneurs are developing the region’s infrastructure, the salient feature of 
Indian firms is the supply of IT technical services, capacity building and training (Taylor 
2006). Currently, India has a leading role in the telecommunications sector, transfer of 
technology and training of human resources in Africa (Broadman 2008). In addition, among 
BRICS countries India is the largest leaser and purchaser of land in Africa (Carmody 2013). 
As an example, Indians have invested more than US$1bn in farms in Ethiopia (The 
Economist 2013a). This is due to the sharp decline of the agricultural productivity in central 
and northern India that is forcing India to invest in Africa to cover its internal demands for 
agro-fuels and food (Carmody 2013). However, in its quest to produce food and agro-fuels, 
India has been involved in numerous scandals of land-grabbing activities (ibid.). 
5.5  Behaviour of Indian businesses in Africa 
Numerous studies conducted about the features of Indian multinationals in Africa have 
identified that Indian firms exhibit greater integration into domestic markets, operate 
extensively through informal channels and have greater access to the local political and 
social economy, due to the long ties of the large Indian Diaspora in Africa (Taylor 2006; 
Broadman 2007, 2008; Alvarenga et al. 2009). Indeed, the Indian Government encourages 
the penetration of Indian businesses in African countries with large Indian Diaspora because 
it values their remittances for India’s economic growth (Taylor 2006). 
 
Another salient feature is that Indian firms tend to be privately owned, are varied in size and 
scale of their structures and are less vertically integrated than Chinese firms (Broadman 
2008). Additionally, they prefer to enter in diversified markets and sell their products to 
private markets rather than African state agencies (ibid.). On the other hand, Indian firms 
obtain supplies from local African markets and promote the integration of the management 
and their workers into the socioeconomic African environment (ibid.). Indeed, an increasing 
number of international companies prefer to hire Indians as managers due to their integration 
and abilities to relate to the African culture and to interact with local communities (Alvarenga 
et al. 2009). According to Broadman (2008) in a survey of 450 business owners in Africa, 
almost half of the participants who were of Indian descent had also taken on African 
nationalities. This is an advantage that allows Indian firms to acquire existing businesses 
from the host society.  
                                               
37 Moreover, India’s interest in Africa spurred during the emergence of the Non-Aligned Movement (1961) and continued with its 
support to different anti-colonialist and anti-apartheid struggles in the region (Naidu 2013). 
38 The value of bilateral trade jumped from US$5.3bn in 2001 to US$12bn in 2005 to US$63bn in 2011 (WTO 2013: 15). 
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5.6  CSR of Indian firms in Africa 
In August 2014, India became the first country in the world to enforce companies to spend    
2 per cent of their net profits on social development initiatives (Prasad 2014). At the policy 
level, issuing a CSR programme or at least a set of principles has been welcomed as an 
important innovation; however, many Indian firms and even thinktanks have criticised the 
decision (ibid.). They argue that 2 per cent is a large proportion and it will be chaotic to 
monitor the expenditures on social welfare. However, CSR is a not a new phenomenon and 
is already a common corporate strategy on the agenda of large Indian businesses. Unlike 
China, philanthropy and social duties are embedded features in the culture and religion of 
Indian firms. Sagar and Singla (2004) have noted that spirituality is rooted in the ethos of 
Indian corporations. 
 
Indian firms consider that philanthropy is the most direct way to improve business 
responsibility in societies of developing countries. Due to the transition from an agricultural to 
an industrialised economy, India developed a myriad of social imbalances, and CSR was 
viewed as one way to address them (Lattemann et al. 2009). Many firms adopted the view 
that a company is not only responsible for itself, but also for its customers, workers, 
shareholders and community (ibid.). In addition, India – which once heavily depended on 
foreign aid from Britain – and Indian companies have internalised these dynamics and thus 
are replicating them in their business mentality (Visser 2008).  
 
Some favourable reports claim that Indian businesses have prioritised labour issues, 
community engagement and sustainable environmental practices. It has been noted that 
Indian CSR practices in Africa are based on participatory projects and empowering local 
communities as stakeholders (Naidu 2013). The common phrase to describe this dynamic is 
‘capacity building’. One example is their involvement in the African educational sector. In 
fact, India’s Pan-African e-network project is the biggest educational programme that 
connects 53 African countries with top Indian universities. Additionally, at least 15,000 
African students are enrolled in Indian universities, and India has provided scholarships for 
22,000 African students (Naidu 2013). However, as noted previously, little monitoring exists 
of the actual way in which these activities are carried out by independent bodies, particularly 
in Africa. 
5.7 How do Chinese and Indian firms compare to those in the 
 rest of the BRICS? 
The main difference between Chinese and Indian firms in Africa in terms of CSR is their 
engagement with local communities. According to Taylor (2012) ‘about 60 per cent of Indian 
aid is directed towards technical assistance. This reflects the central position of human 
resource development in India’s development efforts in Africa’ (Taylor 2012: 788). In 
contrast, the idea of CSR in Chinese firms is relatively new and much of the problem lies in 
their focus on short-term philanthropic activities. Chinese firms provide on a voluntary basis 
what the Chinese Government requires them to do in the region, instead of engaging with 
African communities and addressing their needs. 
 
Indian companies have a better reputation in terms of CSR ‘good corporate citizen’ practices 
and care more about their image than Chinese firms (Taylor 2012). One example of evidence 
is that in 2006 Nigeria put in a bid of US$2bn for an offshore Nigerian oil field, only to see 
that the Indian Government deemed the investment as commercially unfeasible. The Indian 
cabinet blocked the deal, arguing that political repercussions and risk were extremely high. 
On the other hand, the Chinese state-owned China National Offshore Oil Corporation bought 
a 45 per cent working interest in the field, while ethical considerations were not significant in 
its decision (Taylor 2012).  
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However, there are important setbacks that have affected negatively the image of the Indian 
presence in Africa. Indian firms have been criticised for low economic development, 
corruption, and cases of resistance to dialogue with stakeholders, among others (Naidu 
2013). For example, in 2006 Indians gained the reputation of running the most corrupt firms: 
the Transparency International report Bribe Payers Index 2006 ranked Indian companies as 
the worst offender companies that were more likely to engage in corruption activities and 
bribes in developing countries in that year. This issue remains particularly acute amongst the 
Indian firms investing in the African energy sector (Transparency International 2006). 
 
Nonetheless, the activities of Indian and Chinese firms are probably no worse than those of 
other BRICS countries in the region. Alongside Brazil and South Africa, Russian companies 
were ranked at the top of the worst companies that routinely pay bribes as a way of doing 
business abroad (Transparency International 2011). Indeed, Bribe Payers Index 2011 
reported that Russian companies were ranked as the worst (28th place) followed by Chinese 
(27th), while Indians ranked 19th, South Africans 15th and Brazilians 14th (ibid.). Similarly, 
the reputations of multinational companies from Brazil, Russia and South Africa have been 
highly criticised by leading non-profit organisations such as the Berne Declaration 
(Switzerland) and Greenpeace. Brazil holds a reputation for developing human resources 
and training in Africa. Surprisingly, the Brazilian mining giant Vale was singled out as having 
the most ‘contempt for the environment and human rights’ in the world (Chaudhuri 2012). 
Similarly, the South African mining company AngloGold Ashanti has been accused of 
poisoning communities and contaminating lands than can no longer be farmed in Ghana 
(Greenpeace 2011). As a result, this company received the worst rating for social and 
environmental protection from the Ghanaian Environmental Protection Agency in 2011 
(Chaudhuri 2012). Finally, the Russian firm Gazprom was awarded the ‘distinction’ of 
practising the worst CSR in 2014 due to severe damage to the environment and violation of 
environmental regulations through oil spills. 
 
Overall, the CSR practices of the countries examined in this study are varied. China seems 
to have difficulty in changing its hard approach of poorly responsible business in the region, 
in many sectors, due to its voracious need for domestic economic growth (Broadman 2008). 
India seems to have a less expansionist agenda but that does not necessarily mean its 
agenda in Africa is altruistic. There is evidence that Indian companies have engaged in 
scandals or land-grabs and exacerbated local corruption with the complicity of African elites 
(Carmody 2013). Similarly, firms from Brazil, South Africa and Russia have also engaged in 
poor corporative practices in the region.   
 
On the other hand, multinational companies are showing that they are willing to implement 
CSR policies, which can be a powerful force for African development. However, this study 
has shown that most of the strategies followed by the BRICS multinationals to maximise their 
profits and geopolitical influence in Africa do not suggest an overall positive assessment of 
their behaviour. Additionally, the lack of incentives to develop a strong civil society in Africa, 
and the lack of institutional empowerment for stakeholders to monitor the operation of these 
companies in the region, leaves it up to the companies to comply with their own 
commitments. With this set-up, it makes it more difficult to prove whether companies are in 
reality following through with their own CSR commitments.  
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6  Conclusions  
 
Businesses from the BRICS in Africa are beginning to be scrutinised with regard to their role 
as potential development partners. This study has aimed to distinguish the contributions 
these businesses may make to development as ‘traditional’ (economic development, 
employment generation, building of infrastructure, generating tax revenue for the state) and 
‘progressive’ (targeting poor communities, integrating local communities within the core 
operations of the firm, respect for the environment and protection of human rights).  
 
Business activity from some BRICS countries in Africa – for example, China and India – is 
more widely known and reported on than for other members of the bloc. A review of the 
media coverage as well as the academic literature suggests that China engages in traditional 
development activities and that progressive development approaches are considered less 
helpful for local development (perhaps inspired by the Chinese development trajectory itself) 
and when they are applied, tend to be subsumed in incipient CSR activities which still lack a 
deep connection to the needs and desires of the local communities in Africa where they 
operate.  
 
Indian businesses seem to offer a softer version of the Chinese traditional approach minus 
the abundant provision of support for infrastructure but counterbalanced by greater 
embeddedness in local communities, thanks to the large number of African citizens of Indian 
descent (Diaspora as well as African-born) which also are over-represented in the African 
business sector.  
 
Other members of the bloc (Brazil, South Africa and Russia) have seen lower levels of 
scrutiny on their activities in Africa and therefore have received more attention in this study, 
which also provides original material from interviews carried out in those countries with 
business people and other stakeholders linked to their operations in Africa.  
 
Brazil, South Africa and Russia have different modes of engagement in Africa, with Russia 
being the less experienced country with regard to partnership models for development. The 
Russian presence in Africa is small enough for its inexperience to be less likely to be 
analysed in the literature and even the media. However, Russia’s business practices with 
regard to development are even more traditional than those of Chinese and Indian firms. 
Russian firms lack the organisational capacity and the interest in engaging with African 
communities beyond short-term charity projects on a small scale. Brazilian and South African 
firms present a real mix of traditional and progressive approaches and activities to 
development in Africa. 
 
BRICS countries’ business behaviour abroad may differ markedly from how it is conducted at 
home, depending on the host country’s regulatory framework, needs and enforcement 
capacity. However, it is clear that businesses from those countries where a more progressive 
approach is favoured in their own domestic markets (such as Brazil, South Africa and India) 
tend to attempt carrying out more progressive projects and approaches to development when 
they operate in Africa (even if in the case of South Africa there are some anxieties in other 
African countries with regard to their ‘regional dominance’ intentions). One of the main 
lessons from this study is that BRICS countries, just like their Western predecessors, tend to 
apply the approaches that work in their own countries to their new markets, often without 
analysing whether these approaches can be transferred or whether they only worked 
because of a particular set of conditions that no longer exist.  
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The trend amongst BRICS country businesses operating in Africa nowadays is to emphasise 
economic partnerships and mutual benefits in modalities that are much closer to the 
‘traditional’ role of business in development than the ‘progressive’ one. Perhaps because the 
recent history of all BRICS countries shows that it was economic partnerships rather than 
pure aid which supported their development pathways. 
 
All in all, expectations of business behaviour from the BRICS that may lead to more 
progressive roles for business in development are yet to be realised. The type of 
partnerships and development projects between BRICS country businesses and African 
governments continue to evolve towards a more commercial pathway, and one that is more 
traditional than progressive.  
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